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ABSTRACT

MEASURING PREFERENCES FOR UNCERTAINTY

Robert Mislavsky
Uri Simonsohn
Understanding decision making under uncertainty is crucial for researchers in the social
sciences, policymakers, and anyone trying to make sense of another’s (or their own)
choices. In this dissertation, my coauthors and I make three contributions to
understanding preferences for uncertainty regarding (a) how preferences are measured,
(b) how these preferences may (or may not) manifest in a consequential real-world
context, and (c) how different types of advice influence opinions about uncertain events.
In Chapter 1, we examine methods that researchers use to study preferences for
uncertainty. We find that the presence of uncertainty is often confounded with the
presence of “weird” transaction features, dramatically overstating the presence of
uncertainty aversion in these experiments. In Chapter 2, we show that extreme
uncertainty does not exist in the context of corporate experimentation, despite speculation
by pundits and researchers. In fact, people judge experiments similarly to how they
would judge simple gambles, with the experiment being judged near the “expected value”
of the policies it implements. In Chapter 3, we find that the format in which uncertainty is
presented impacts how people combine forecasts from multiple sources. Numeric
probability forecasts are averaged, while verbal forecasts are combined additively, with
people making more extreme judgments as they see additional forecasts.
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1
INTRODUCTION

Understanding decision making under uncertainty is crucial for researchers in the
social sciences, policymakers, and anyone trying to make sense of another’s (or their
own) choices. In this dissertation, my coauthors and I make three contributions to
understanding preferences for uncertainty. First, we examine how preferences for
uncertainty are typically measured, finding that many common methods may overstate
the presence of uncertainty aversion in experiments. Second, we test preferences for
uncertainty in a consequential real-world context, corporate experimentation, where a
company’s employees and customers are randomly assigned to different outcomes.
Finally, we show that when presented with multiple forecasts for uncertain events, people
combine these forecasts differently depending on whether they are provided numerically
or verbally, resulting in potentially drastic differences in internal judgments of an event’s
uncertainty. Taken together, our findings have consequences for researchers,
organizational decision makers and policymakers, and individuals, which we discuss
throughout.
In the first chapter of my dissertation, “When Risk is Weird: Unexplained
Transaction Features Lower Valuations,” we examine a potential cause of a major
behavioral anomaly in risk preference, the uncertainty effect (Gneezy, List, & Wu, 2006).
Although prior research on the uncertainty effect finds the introduction of risk causes
substantial violations of the internality axiom, where participants value a gamble less
than its worst outcome, we find that this is likely caused by the presence of what we call
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“weird” transaction features. In typical risk preference studies, valuations of risky
gambles are typically compared to valuations of certain outcomes. However, risky
gambles often include additional features, such as purchasing a lottery ticket or flipping a
coin, whereas the certain outcomes do not. We propose that an aversion to weird features,
rather than uncertainty itself, drives the extreme risk aversion found in paradigms such as
the uncertainty effect. As a result, we believe that these studies typically overstate the
presence of risk aversion. In an incentivized experiment under high stakes, participants
are essentially risk neutral when comparing gambles with “weird” transaction features to
certain outcomes that have the same transaction features.
In the second chapter, “Critical Condition: People Only Object to Corporate
Experiments If They Object to a Condition,” we investigate preferences for uncertainty in
a consequential real-world context—corporate experimentation. Although
experimentation is one of the most effective tools for determining the impact of a given
policy, which could allow organizations to test whether certain policies are beneficial
before rolling them out more broadly, there is a widespread perception that people dislike
corporate experimentation as a general rule (e.g., M. N. Meyer, 2015; M. N. Meyer &
Chabris, 2015). If such “experiment aversion” exists, it could severely hamper the ability
of researchers to learn about the world and test theories in real-world settings. However,
in 5 studies, we show that a general experiment aversion does not exist. Rather, people
dislike experiments only when they dislike a specific policy that the experiment
implements. Further, people evaluate experiments with an objectionable policy more
favorably than the policy itself.
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In the final chapter, “60% + 60% = 60%, but Likely + Likely = Very Likely,” we
find differences in how people combine probability forecasts from multiple advisors
depending on whether those forecasts are given numerically or verbal. Specifically, we
find that, consistent with prior research (e.g., Budescu & Yu 2006, 2007), participants
average numeric probability forecasts. For example, if two weather forecasters predict
that there is a “60% chance” and a “70% chance,” respectively, that it will rain,
participants’ own predictions typically lie between 60% and 70%. However, participants
combine verbal forecasts more additively. That is, if the forecasters say rain is “probable”
and “likely,” participants tend to make predictions that are more extreme than each
forecaster individually (e.g., “very likely”).
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CHAPTER 1.

WHEN RISK IS WEIRD:
UNEXPLAINED TRANSACTION FEATURES LOWER VALUATIONS

Robert Mislavsky
Uri Simonsohn

ABSTRACT

We define transactions as weird when they include unexplained features, that is, features
not implicitly, explicitly, or self-evidently justified, and propose that people are averse to
weird transactions. In six experiments, we show that risky options used in previous
research paradigms often attained uncertainty via adding an unexplained transaction
feature (e.g., purchasing a coin flip or lottery), and behavior that appears to reflect risk
aversion could instead reflect an aversion to weird transactions. Specifically, willingness
to pay drops just as much when adding risk to a transaction as when adding unexplained
features. Holding transaction features constant, adding additional risk does not further
reduce willingness to pay. We interpret our work as generalizing ambiguity aversion to
riskless choice.
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The amount people are willing to pay for a given item is influenced by the context
in which the purchase takes place (Ariely, Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2006; Jung, Perfecto,
& Nelson, 2016; Lichtenstein & Slovic, 2006). Transactions, the necessary steps to
acquire the item, are a part of every purchase context.
In this paper, we identify a transaction attribute which negatively influences
willingness to pay: the extent to which it contains features that lack an explanation. These
explanations may be (i) implicit, based directly on consumers’ past experiences with
similar transactions, (ii) explicit, explained by the seller, or (iii) self-evident, based on
reasonable inferences from context. For brevity, we refer to transactions that include
unexplained features as “weird.” When using the term weird, we refer exclusively to such
a definition—the presence of unexplained features.
To illustrate how the presence of unexplained features may manifest itself in a
transaction and how the three aforementioned types of explanations might mitigate their
impact on willingness to pay, consider a restaurant that sells lunches by placing them in
boxes and then asks people to pay for the right to open the box and take the lunch from
the box. Placing the lunch in a box and asking to pay to open it could constitute an
unexplained transaction feature and may make customers uncomfortable or suspicious
(e.g., is the lunch in the box because the restaurant doesn’t want you to see what it really
looks like?). An explanation could easily mitigate any such consequences. An implicit
explanation would be if the “box” was simply a vending machine; customers could draw
on their prior experience and the transaction feature is no longer unexplained.
Alternatively, the restaurant could provide an explicit explanation “These are our new
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self-service boxes, which we’ve introduced to help you get your food more easily.” The
transaction feature is again no longer unexplained thus no longer expected to reduce
valuations.
Note that unexplained is not the same as novel. A completely novel transaction
feature could come with an explanation. For example, imagine a restaurant that requires
customers to draw on a piece of glass with their finger in order to get their lunch. That is
an unusual transaction feature. But if the glass is an iPad screen, and the drawing is the
customer’s signature, customers facing this transaction feature for the very first time
would easily generate a self-evident explanation for why the transaction feature is there. It
would not be expected to lower valuations.
We conjecture that the presence of unexplained features lowers willingness to pay
because they trigger reactions akin to ambiguity aversion (Ellsberg, 1961; Frisch &
Baron, 1988; Keren & Gerritsen, 1999) in general and comparative ignorance in
particular (Chow & Sarin, 2001; Fox & Tversky, 1995; Fox & Weber, 2002). Relevant
but unknown information may make consumers less confident in the decision to make the
purchase (Chow & Sarin, 2001; Fox & Tversky, 1995; Fox & Weber, 2002) or perhaps
make them feel the seller has more information that she may use to her advantage (Frisch
& Baron, 1988, p. 153; Keren & Gerritsen, 1999). The presence of unexplained features
creates an imbalance between seller and buyer in terms of what relevant information they
have for the transaction. Weirdness aversion, the aversion to transactions with
unexplained features, may then constitute the generalization of ambiguity aversion to
situations that lack (explicit) uncertainty.
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We demonstrate the practical relevance of an aversion to unexplained transaction
features by focusing on a research paradigm where researchers unintentionally
manipulated the presence of unexplained transaction features and obtained a result, often
referred to as the “uncertainty effect” (Gneezy et al., 2006). We find that the uncertainty
effect may instead be caused by weirdness, or the presence of unexplained transaction
features.
Gneezy et al. (2006) documented that people were willing to pay less for a risky
prospect than for its worst possible outcome. For instance, people were willing to pay an
average of $26.10 for a $50 Barnes and Noble gift card but only $16.12 for a gamble
where participants were guaranteed to win either a $50 or $100 gift card, each with a
50% probability. This general finding has been replicated by many independent research
teams (e.g., Andreoni & Sprenger, 2011; Newman & Mochon, 2012; Simonsohn, 2009;
Yitong Wang, Feng, & Keller, 2013; Yang, Vosgerau, & Loewenstein, 2013).1
These uncertainty effect studies pit valuations of a risky option against valuations
of a riskless one. The risky option requires a mechanism that introduces risk, while the
riskless option does not. For example, researchers have generated risky prospects by
asking participants to buy coin flips, lottery tickets, unlabeled envelopes, and gift cards of
unknown value and have compared participants’ valuations of these transactions to that
of buying a gift card outright. There is no explicit nor implicit justification to sell gift
1

Keren and Willemsen (2009) report results where the uncertainty effect is not observed when comparing
average valuations. Gideon Keren shared the raw data from that article with us. We analyzed it as in
Simonsohn (2009), comparing the entire distributions of responses and found that a substantial share of
participants do show the effect. Rydval et al. (2009) provide the only failure to replicate the uncertainty
effect that we are aware of. Their favored explanation is that participants in other experiments
misunderstood the task and/or payoffs. Yang et al. (2013) find that the uncertainty effect is only observed
for willingness to pay and not for willingness to accept measures.

8
cards of unknown value or to utilize a coin flip to determine their value. Therefore, while
these mechanisms do generate risk, they also introduce unexplained features to the
transaction.
Uncertainty effect studies, therefore, have included a risky transaction with
unexplained features and a not risky one without unexplained features, perfectly
confounding risk with weirdness. In this paper, we report studies that manipulate the
presence of unexplained features independently of risk. Our results are consistent with an
aversion to unexplained features accounting for somewhere between the preponderance
and the totality of the uncertainty effect. After presenting our empirical results, we
discuss how unexplained features could be present in other paradigms used to study
consumer behavior.

TRANSPARENT REPORTING
Studies 1-5 were run on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were
administered through Qualtrics. Study 6 was incentive compatible and run in a behavioral
lab. For all studies we decided sample size before collecting any data. MTurk participants
were not allowed to participate in more than one study. We included attention checks for
Studies 5A and 5B. Studies 5A, 5B, and 6 were preregistered. For all studies we report all
data exclusions (if any), all manipulations, and all measures. Data, analysis code,
preregistrations, and survey materials are available at http://osf.io/x8cqm.
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STUDIES 1-3: WEIRD, BUT NOT RISKY
Our first three studies are similar, so we present them together. In all three we
modified the traditional uncertainty effect paradigm to disentangle the effect of risk from
the effect of unexplained features on valuations. For a more fluent reading experience, we
refer to transaction that include unexplained features as “weird” and to the presence of
such features as “weirdness.” The uncertainty effect paradigm pits the valuation of a
riskless prospect (e.g., buying a $50 Target gift card) against that of a risky one (e.g.,
flipping a coin to determine if the gift card is for Target or for Walmart). This paradigm
confounds risk and weirdness because the manipulation that introduces risk also
introduces unexplained features to the transaction (e.g., flipping a coin). To examine the
importance of this confound, we created a third type of transaction, one that was weird
but not risky. Specifically, this was a transaction that includes the same unexplained
features present in the risky transactions (e.g., buying a token redeemable for a gift card)
but with a certain outcome (e.g., the value of the gift card is known).

Method
Design. In Study 1 (N = 603; 29.6% female), we randomly assigned participants
to one of three conditions asking them indicate their maximum WTP for a transaction.
The first two were analogous to traditional uncertainty effect studies:
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Condition 1. Neither weird nor risky:2
We want to know how much you would be willing to pay for two different
items, a $50 Walmart
gift card and a $50 Target gift card.
If you could buy only the $50 Walmart gift card, what is the most
you would pay for it?
If you could buy only the $50 Target gift card, what is the most you
would pay for it?

Condition 2. Weird and risky:
Imagine that you are standing in front of a table that has a locked
box on it. The box has two gift cards inside: a $50 Walmart and a
$50 Target gift card.
You can pay to open the box and choose a gift card, which will be
yours to keep. The gift cards do not have the names of the stores
printed on them, so you will not know which gift card is which.
What is the most you would be willing to pay to open the box?

Uncertainty effect studies compare the valuation of similar pairs of transactions. Any
difference in WTP can therefore be caused by the risk difference (having a known vs.
unknown outcome) or by the weirdness difference (buying outright vs. paying to open a
box). We addressed this confound by adding a weird but not risky condition. Participants
read the same scenario as those in the weird and risky condition, except the gift cards were
labeled, so participants knew which card they were getting before choosing. Specifically,
it read (differences between Conditions 2 and 3 underlined here but not in original
materials):
Condition 3. Weird but not risky:
Imagine that you are standing in front of a table that has a locked
box on it. The box has two gift cards inside: a $50 Walmart and a
$50 Target gift card.

2

In Study 1, some participants valued Walmart/Target gift cards and others valued Amazon/Barnes &
Noble gift cards. Because subsequent studies only included the former, we report results for the latter in
footnote 3. We also collected data on self-reported average expenditures in other purchases to use as
covariates to increase power, but they were uncorrelated with the dependent variable and therefore not
useful. We did not collect these in subsequent studies. See Supplement 2 for covariate results.
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You can pay to open the box and choose a gift card, which will be
yours to keep. The gift cards have the names of the stores printed
on them, so you will know which gift card is which.
What is the most you would be willing to pay to open the box?

After running this study, we identified a potential confound. The weird
transactions (paying to take one of two gift cards from a box) had two possible outcomes,
while the not weird transaction had only one. We believed this difference, rather than
weirdness, could explain any observed differences (e.g., because people are averse to
explicitly rejecting an outcome). In Study 2 (N = 308; 35.5% female) we reran the two
weird conditions and added a new weird condition that had only one possible outcome.
Across the three conditions, then, participants paid to open a box and take a card from it.
The conditions differed on whether the box contained one labeled gift card (new
condition), two labeled gift cards, or two unlabeled gift cards. We did not rerun the
neither risky nor weird condition.
In Study 3 (N = 403; 36.8% female) we reran all four conditions from Studies 1
and 2 with a different operationalization of risk and weirdness: purchasing a token at an
event and redeeming it for a gift card. The four conditions were:
1. Neither weird nor risky
What is the highest amount you would be willing to pay for a $50
[Walmart/Target] gift card?
(Target and Walmart counterbalanced within-subjects)

2. Weird but not risky, one option
Imagine that you are at an event where there are tokens for sale.
These tokens can be redeemed at a cashier for a $50
[Walmart/Target] gift card. What is the highest amount you would
be willing to pay for one of these tokens?
(Target and Walmart counterbalanced within-subjects)
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3. Weird but not risky, two options
Imagine that you are at an event where there are tokens for sale.
These tokens can be redeemed at a cashier for your choice of
either a $50 Walmart gift card or a $50 Target gift card. What
is the highest amount you would be willing to pay for one of
these tokens?

4. Weird and risky
Imagine that you are at an event where there are tokens for
sale. These tokens can be redeemed at a cashier for either a $50
Walmart gift card or a $50 Target gift card. The cashier will
flip the token, and if it lands on heads, you will receive the
Walmart gift card. If it lands on tails, you will receive the
Target gift card. What is the highest amount you would be willing
to pay for one of these tokens?

Results
Figure 1 depicts results for Studies 1-3. We identify four main takeaways:
1. In Studies 1 and 3, we replicate the original uncertainty effect (Study 2 does
not allow testing it). Participants valued the weird and risky prospects (M =
$25.80), less than their least-valued neither weird nor risky gift card (M =
$39.37). The risky option was valued significantly less than its worst outcome
in both studies, ts > 6.58, ps < .001.
2. Holding weirdness constant, there is no apparent uncertainty effect.
Comparing the two weird conditions, risky gift cards (M = $25.60 across all
studies) were not valued significantly less than the riskless gift cards (M =
$28.39 across all studies), whether they had one or two options (Study 1:
t(199) = 1.92, p = .057; Study 3: ts < 1.64, ps > .10). Based on point-estimates
of the means, the effect of weirdness is two-thirds (Study 1) to three-quarters
(Study 3) as large as the uncertainty effect is when weirdness is not accounted
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for.3 We believe some of this residual effect we are attributing to uncertainty
is also attributable to weirdness, because it seems likely that, in these
scenarios, uncertainty makes the weird scenarios weirder by adding an
additional unexplained feature, flipping a token to determine the value of a
gift card. We could not estimate this for Study 2, because it did not include a
not weird condition.
3. Contrary to our initial expectations, these results are not driven by the number
of potential options. Valuations for the weird but not risky transactions are
similar when they involve one or two possible outcomes, ts < .71, ps > .47.
4. Study 3 rules out a potential confound for Studies 1 and 2. In the box
scenarios, participants may have believed that they had to make two
payments, one to open the box and another to purchase the gift card. Because
very few participants paid $0 in the weird scenarios (as would be expected if
this were the case; see Supplement 2), we believe this is unlikely, although a
reviewer also raised the possibility that participants may have averaged the
two payments when reporting their WTP. We obtain very similar results in the
token scenario, where this ambiguity is not present, which appears to rule this
possibility out.

3

For the Barnes & Noble and Amazon gift cards in Study 1, the means are $35.91 (neither weird nor risky),
$27.77 (weird but not risky), and $22.30 (weird and risky). The total uncertainty effect amounts to $13.61,
with weirdness accounting for nearly 60% of the effect.
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Figure 1. Average valuations (Studies 1-3) as a function of risk and weirdness

Notes: Hypothetical valuations for $50 gift cards. Risk involves whether it is for Target or Walmart,
operationalized via opening a box and selecting one of two unlabeled envelopes (Studies 1 & 2), or
purchasing a token exchangeable for one of the two gift cards, determined by flipping the token (Study 3).
Weird but riskless involves labeled envelopes (Studies 1 & 2), or participants choosing what to redeem the
token for (Study 3). Transactions with one outcome (bottom row) involve box with 1 gift card (Study 2) or
token with predetermined value (Study 3). Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

STUDY 4: BIGGER DIFFERENCES IN OUTCOMES
In the first three experiments, the risky prospects involved gift cards with the
same face value ($50) for different stores (e.g., Target vs. Walmart). This design,
originally used by Newman and Mochon (2012), allowed us to create weird but not risky
conditions where participants could meaningfully choose between gift cards, whereas
choosing between a $50 card and a $100 card is not a meaningful choice. However,
minimizing outcome variance may have inflated the importance of the unexplained
features. In other words, we may have found risk did not matter much because we created
situations without much risk. In this experiment, we created risky prospects with greater
outcome variance.
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Method
Sample. We recruited 604 participants (39.4% female), each paid $0.25.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight conditions in a
between-subjects design. Two not weird conditions were similar to those in Studies 1 and
3: participants provided their WTP for either a $50 Target gift card or a $100 Target gift
card bought outright. The remaining six conditions involved weird transactions and
conformed to a 2 (transaction: box vs. token) x 3 (value: $50 vs. $100 vs. risky) design.
Participants read either the box or token scenarios from the prior studies, where the
outcomes were either a $50 Target gift card for sure, a $100 Target gift card for sure, or a
Target gift card that was worth either $50 or $100, each with 50% probability. We did not
include a condition where participants could choose either a $50 or $100 gift card
because we assumed all participants would choose $100. We decided before data
collection began to obtain 120 observations from the not weird conditions and 60 from
each weird condition (since we had two versions of weirdness, 60*2=120).
Results
Beginning with the token conditions, the uncertainty effect was again replicated
when not accounting for transaction weirdness. Participants valued the risky token $6.27
less than they did its worst possible outcome purchased outright (M = $37.23 and M =
$43.50, respectively), t(179) = 2.70, p = .008. Comparing the weird conditions, people
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paid $5.59 more for the risky prospect (token exchangeable for $50 gift card: M =
$31.64; risky token: M = $37.23), t(118) = 1.57, p = .12.4
The uncertainty effect was also replicated in the box conditions ($50 Target gift
card bought outright: M = $43.50; risky box: M = $25.23), t(180) = 9.13, p < .001. The
difference between the risky prospect and its least valued outcome was much smaller
when comparing the two weird conditions ($50 gift card in box: M = $29.44; risky box
with $50 or $100 gift card: M = $25.23), t(120) = 1.40, p = .16. The total uncertainty
effect is about $18 ($43.50-$25.23). The effect of weirdness alone is about $14. As
argued above, the residual $4 effect could be the result of weirdness if choosing among
unlabeled cards seems less justified than taking a labeled card out of a box.
There was also a sizable main effect of weirdness for individual valuations of the
$50 and $100 gift cards. Buying a $50 or $100 gift card outright was valued at $43.50
and $86.49, respectively, whereas a $50 or $100 gift card in a box was valued at $29.44
and $51.47, respectively, and a token exchangeable for a $50 or $100 gift card was
valued at $31.64 and $65.93, respectively, ts > 5.38, ps < .001. We report all pairwise
comparisons in Supplement 4. In sum, we obtain results similar to those of Studies 1-3
using risky prospects with greater outcome variance. The data are consistent with
unexplained features accounting for somewhere between the preponderance and the
totality of the uncertainty effect.
4

Analyzing the data as in Simonsohn (2009), the lower bound of people paying less for the uncertain item
is 3.3% in the token conditions and 19.7% in the box conditions, neither of which is significantly greater
than 0 (ps > .09). See Supplement 4.
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STUDIES 5A AND 5B: EVALUATING WEIRDNESS OF PRIOR UNCERTAINTY
EFFECT STUDIES
In Study 5 we more directly test if prior uncertainty effect studies have
unintentionally manipulated weirdness by asking participants to evaluate the weirdness of
the underlying transactions in those studies.
One may measure weirdness on absolute or relative scales, although each has its
limitations. Absolute scales (e.g., “How weird is this transaction?”) are ambiguous about
what a transaction is being compared to, or equivalently, what the values in the scale
represent. Relative scales, on the other hand, (e.g., “Which transaction is weirder?”), may
create demand effects or change participants’ definitions of weirdness where they think
the weirdest transaction is the one that is least like the others (even though it may be the
simplest). Since neither approach was obviously superior, we pursued both, and in both
cases we explicitly defined weirdness to our participants as involving the presence of
unexplained features. Participants judged weirdness on both an absolute scale (Study 5A)
and on a relative scale (Study 5B). We obtained consistent results with both methods.
Risky transactions in prior uncertainty effect studies are weirder than their riskless
counterparts.
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STUDY 5A: BETWEEN-SUBJECTS RATINGS OF WEIRDNESS
Method
Sample. We recruited 714 MTurk participants, 600 of whom (53.3% female, Mage
= 35.3 years) passed an attention check and were able to continue to the rest of the
survey, each paid $0.40 (pre-registration: https://aspredicted.org/3mu9d.pdf).
Design. In a between-subjects design, participants evaluated the weirdness of
transactions used in prior uncertainty effect studies. Participants began by reading this
passage:
We will show you an example of a purchase that experimenters ask
participants to evaluate. We are interested in knowing how
“weird” you think the purchase is. By “weird,” we mean how much
the purchase has unusual and unexplained features.

Participants then read one of eight questions used in prior uncertainty effect
studies—two from Gneezy et al. (2006), three from Yang et al. (2013), and three from
this paper. Three of these questions were “baseline” questions (i.e., the riskless valuations
that were used as control conditions in uncertainty effect studies).5 We preregistered that
we would collapse the ratings for these conditions for analysis. The other five valuations
were used in prior studies—Gneezy et al.’s (2006, p. 1301) lottery, Yang et al.’s (2013, p.
737) certain and uncertain coins, our certain and uncertain boxes (Study 4). See the
Appendix for the exact text of these stimuli. After reading the question, participants rated
its weirdness using the following scale: “How weird is it to buy a gift [card/certificate]
These questions were slightly adapted in order to sound like an actual transaction (e.g., “Imagine you are
buying this”) rather than an abstract valuation (e.g., “What is the most you are willing to pay for this?”).
5
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like this?” (1 = It is not weird at all; 2 = It is a little weird; 3 = It is very weird; 4 = It is
extremely weird). If risk and weirdness were confounded in these studies, we would
expect that the weird transactions would be rated as weirder than the baseline ones.
Results. Consistent with the notion that prior uncertainty effect studies have
confounded risk and weirdness, participants rated all of the weird transactions (1.94 ≤ Ms
≤ 2.68) as weirder than the baseline transaction (M = 1.35), all ts > 4.83, all ps < .001.
See Figure 2, panel (i). In addition to this pre-registered comparison, we compared the
share of participants rating a transaction as “not weird at all.” Seventy percent of
participants gave this rating to the baseline transaction compared to between 8% and 39%
for the weird transactions, Zs > 4.45, ps < .001.
STUDY 5B: WITHIN-SUBJECTS RANKINGS OF WEIRDNESS
Method
Sample. We recruited 184 participants, 153 of whom (42.7% female, Mage = 35.5
years) passed an attention check and were able to continue to the rest of the survey, each
paid $0.40 (pre-registration: https://aspredicted.org/p4hi5.pdf).
Design. All participants were given the same instructions as in Study 5A, but
instead of rating them between-subjects, they were shown six transactions (one of the
three baseline transactions and all five weird transactions) and asked to rank them from
weirdest (1) to least weird (6). Ties were not allowed.
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Results
Consistent with Study 5A and more generally with the notion that prior
uncertainty effect studies have confounded risk and weirdness, participants ranked
purchasing a gift card outright as the least weird (M = 4.43 out of 6) out of all the
transactions (between 2.40 for the Risky Box, t(149) = 8.47, p < .001, and 4.00 for the
GLW Lottery, t(149) = 2.00, p = .047). See Figure 2, panel (ii). Here the weirdness
difference between the baseline and the original uncertainty effect (Gneezy et al., 2006)
seems smaller than in Study 5A. Part of this may be explained by some participants
reversing the scale, since 14% of participants ranked the baseline transaction as the
weirdest (the second most popular answer). Nevertheless, looking at the number of
participants who ranked the transaction as least weird, a comparison not included in our
pre-registration, we see a more substantial difference. Specifically, while 46% of people
ranked the baseline as the least weird, only 15% did for the Gneezy et al. (2006) lottery,
Z = 5.97, p < .001.
STUDY 6: INCENTIVIZED LAB STUDY
To this point, all of our studies have used hypothetical scenarios. To address the
possibility that our findings were driven in part by participants’ inattention or lack of
motivation, our last study is an incentive-compatible replication (pre-registration:
https://aspredicted.org/dq97y.pdf).
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Figure 2. Prior uncertainty effect studies are weirder than their baseline comparisons
(i) Between-Subjects Ratings of Weirdness
Study 5A
4 - Extremely
Weird
Baseline

Gneezy et al.
(2006)

Yang et al.
(2013)

Study 4

3
2.7
2.5

2.4

2.1

2
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1.3

1 - Not Weird
at All
Buy Gift Card
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Certain Coin Risky Coin

Certain Box

Risky Box

Transaction

(ii) Within-Subjects Rankings of Weirdness
Study 5B
1 - Weirdest
Baseline

Gneezy et al.
(2006)

Yang et al.
(2013)

Study 4

2
Weirdness Ranking

2.40

3
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3.39
3.72

4
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Notes: Panel (i) shows between-subjects ratings (Study 5A; N=600) of transactions used in prior
uncertainty effect studies (see Appendix). The scenarios were described verbatim to participants. The yaxis shows the average response to the question: ‘We are interested in knowing how “weird” you think the
purchase is . . . By “weird,” we mean how much the purchase has unusual and unexplained features.’
Panel (ii) shows within-subjects rankings of weirdness (Study 5B; N=153) of the same scenarios.

22
Method
Sample. We recruited 219 participants (71.1% female, Mage = 20.8 years) at the
Wharton Behavioral Lab. This study was part of a larger lab session with several
unrelated studies, and all participants were paid $10 for completing the session.
Design. In a three-cell between-subjects design, participants indicated their
willingness to pay (WTP) for an item. The three conditions were (i) buying a $50
Amazon gift card (neither weird nor risky condition), (ii) paying to open a locked box
with a $50 Amazon gift card and taking the card (weird but not risky condition), and (iii)
paying to open a locked box containing a $50 gift card and a $100 gift card, with values
only visible on the inside, and taking a card without knowing its value (weird and risky
condition).
One in every twenty participants was randomly selected to have their decision
count for real and receive a $100 bonus (to fund the purchase). To make the WTP
elicitation incentive-compatible, a price was set but not revealed to participants. If
participants’ WTP was greater than that price, they made the purchase and paid that price.
Otherwise, they kept the entire bonus and did not make a purchase. To indicate their
WTP, we showed participants a price, starting at $5, and they indicated if they would
make the purchase for that amount. If they said yes, we increased the price by $5, and
they answered again. This was repeated until they answered “No” or the price reached
$100.6 The highest price participants said “Yes” to is our dependent variable. We
6

Only one participant (in the neither weird nor risky condition) gave a WTP of $100.
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purposefully avoided a multiple-price-list and used a multiple-price-sequence, concerned
that the price list could prompt participants to choose valuations in the middle of the
range for the uncertainty condition, attenuating the uncertainty effect (original materials:
https://osf.io/x8cqm/).7
Results
Without accounting for weirdness, for the presence of unexplained transaction
features, participants again acted as if they were extremely risk averse. Willingness to
pay for the weird and risky transaction (M = $39.24) was similar to that for the neither
weird nor risky one (M = $38.70), t(143) = .19, p = .85, even though the former has an
expected value approximately 50% higher than the latter. As in prior uncertainty effect
studies, this suggests the presence of direct risk aversion, since neither prospect theory
nor expected utility theory can generate such extreme levels of risk aversion. But if
defined narrowly, as obtaining a strictly lower mean, this result does not replicate the
uncertainty effect.8 In any case, this comparison confounds risk and weirdness.
Controlling for weirdness, participants appear to show very mild (if any) risk
aversion: the risky purchase (M = $39.24) was valued noticeably above the not risky one
7

A reviewer expressed this concern about a multiple-price-sequence that we thought was worth sharing
with readers: “[A] price-sequence may not be innocuous, either: The initial, low prices may serve as
anchors for subjects’ valuations […] which may bias WTPs down. If such anchoring effects were
asymmetric, and were more pronounced for risky or weird transactions (because, say, preferences for risky
or weird transactions are less stable), then they could make the experimental results difficult to interpret.”
To respond to this concern we ran a study on MTurk manipulating whether the multiple-price-sequence
was increasing or decreasing. The effect of weirdness is significant and of the same magnitude for both.
See Supplement 7.
8
Although we preregistered that we would calculate the proportion of the uncertainty effect explained by
weirdness, we could not do this here because we do not directionally replicate the original uncertainty
effect.
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(M = $30.47), t(143) = 2.94, p = .004. In fact, participants valued the uncertain gift card
close to what a risk neutral buyer would be expected to value it. In particular, assuming
participants would pay twice as much for a $100 gift card as they would for a $50 gift
card (which is a conservative assumption that does not account for diminishing sensitivity
or marginal utility), a risk neutral valuation of the risky gift card is $45.71 (1.5 * $30.74),
which is not much higher than what we observe ($39.24), t(143) = 1.77, p = .080.9
Finally, holding risk constant, we replicate weirdness aversion. The not weird
purchase (M = $38.70) was valued above the weird one (M = $30.48), t(144) = 3.17, p =
.002.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
We have documented that the presence of unexplained features lowers willingness
to pay (WTP). We manipulated the presence of such features, weirdness, independently
of risk and found that the effect of weirdness on WTP is of about the same magnitude as
the uncertainty effect, which had previously been attributed to the presence of
uncertainty. These results suggest that subtle transaction features can have dramatic
effects on WTP—dramatic enough for multiple independent research teams to run
successful replications of the original Gneezy et al. (2006) finding, but subtle enough that
they did not notice the potential confound when doing so (including one of us; see
Simonsohn, 2009).
9

To perform this t-test we multiplied all valuations in the weird but not risky condition by 1.5, and
conducted a standard difference of means t-test comparing this new variable with the observed valuations
in the weird and risky condition. The comparison, therefore, treats $45.71 as an estimated magnitude with a
standard error (which it is), rather than as a pre-set constant (which it is not). We did not preregister this
analysis, because we did not expect this valuation to be so high.
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Unexplained features is the key manipulation
We have characterized our key manipulations as increasing weirdness, or
introducing unexplained features to transactions. Some of the seven members of our
review team proposed alternative interpretations for our manipulations. One reviewer
proposed that perhaps we simply manipulated the total number of features (whether weird
or not). We do not believe the number of features per se is critical. First, in an
experiment included in a prior version of the manuscript, we found that merely adding
features did not reduce valuations (see supplement 6). Second, in many empirical studies,
valuations are often elicited with procedure that require different numbers of steps (e.g.,
asking for a price outright vs. going through a multiple-price list), and it has not been
previously documented that transactions with more steps lead to lower valuations. Third,
there is no obvious psychological process that would seem to justify this prediction. In
contrast, we believe that all mechanisms that have been proposed for ambiguity aversion
would also predict that unexplained features lower valuations.
Another reviewer proposed that perhaps what’s special about the features we
introduced is not that they are unexplained features, but that they are unusual features that
transactions outside the lab would not include. That is to say, people would pay less for
opening a box to buy an item, not because they see no reason to have that extra step, but
because outside the lab they have never purchased an item by paying to open the box. We
do not find this alternative explanation compelling either. First, most transactions in the
lab are rather unusual. Take, for example, our baseline condition in incentive-compatible
Study 6. Participants completed a multiple-price sequence which was then compared with
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a pre-set price to determine if they would purchase a $50 gift card held by the
experimenter. This is not a transaction they would engage in outside the lab. And yet,
their WTP was a rather high $38.70 and comparable to the valuations from prior studies
that did not involve the convoluted incentive-compatible mechanism (e.g., $37 in Study 1
here).
Second, we can easily imagine situations where a completely new transaction
feature, because it is accompanied by an explanation, would not be expected to lower
WTP. Consider again that example from the introduction about a person’s first payment
by signing on an iPad, or perhaps an American asked to pay in rubles during her first
coffeeshop visit in Moscow. In these examples, consumers are facing entirely novel
transaction features, but these features have self-evident explanations and would not be
predicted to lower WTP.
When risk is not weird
Our studies manipulate unexplained features independently of risk (i.e., we
include transactions that are weird but not risky), but not risk independently of
unexplained features (i.e., we do not include transactions that are not weird but risky).
The absence of a not weird but risky cell in our experiments may pose some problems for
the interpretation of our studies. If a not weird but risky condition was valued similarly
(or lower) than a weird and risky scenario, it would imply that unexplained features
moderate, rather than account for, the effect of risk in those transactions. Although we
think this is unlikely, our data cannot rule this out.
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This is a challenge to explore empirically because it requires a situation where
risk is an expected feature (e.g., buying stocks), and is therefore not weird. In such
situations, however, offering an option with no risk (e.g., a riskless stock) would be
weird, since it would involve the presence of a feature that requires an explanation (“why
is this stock riskless?”). Yang et al.’s (2013) Experiment 4 provides an example of our
concern. They include a condition where participants indicate their WTP for a coin flip
that paid a $50 gift certificate if the coin landed on heads or tails (“Certain Coin Flip,” p.
737). In our Studies 5A and 5B, we asked participants to rate how weird this transaction
was, and they rated it as weirder than the risky coin flip (i.e., as containing more
unexplained features), likely because a coin flip implies risk and removing risk makes the
coin flip unnecessary.
Further, even holding all features of a transaction constant, all risk per se may not
be equally unexplained. For instance, in most gambling situations, payoffs are inversely
proportional to the probability of winning. Therefore, a lottery with a 1% chance of
winning $100 and a 99% chance of winning $50 is more typical (i.e., has an implicit
explanation) than a gamble with a 99% chance of winning $100 and a 1% chance of
winning $50. If this were true, and if unexplained features reduce valuations, people
should appear more risk averse for the latter lottery. A closer look at Gneezy et al. (2006,
p. 1287) reveals evidence consistent with this conjecture. Participants are risk seeking
(i.e., WTP > Expected Value) when there is a 1% chance of winning the larger price and
risk averse (i.e., WTP < Expected Value) when there is a 99% chance of winning the
larger prize (p. 1287, Table 1). In fact, the median WTP for these two gambles are
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identical ($37.50) in this study. Of course, this is speculative and there are several
potential explanations for these findings that have little to do with the specific transaction
features (e.g., probability weighting; McGraw, Shafir, & Todorov, 2010; Rottenstreich &
Hsee, 2001).
Attributing the uncertainty effect to unexplained transaction features may reconcile
inconsistent findings
The “direct risk aversion” explanation for the uncertainty effect (Gneezy et al.,
2006; Simonsohn, 2009) seems at odds with studies that show consumers responding
more favorably to risky promotions than to riskless ones. Specifically, Mazar,
Shampanier, and Ariely (2016) find that consumers prefer a probabilistic discount to a
certain discount of the same expected value (e.g., a 10% chance of getting item for free
vs. a certain 10% discount), while Goldsmith and Amir (2010) find that offering a
randomly determined prize for making a purchase is nearly as effective as offering the
most attractive prize for sure.
If the uncertainty effect were caused by unexplained transaction features, rather
than direct risk aversion, at least two explanations arise for the apparent contradiction.
First, it may be that consumers can readily identify a reason for a company to offer the
type of promotions examined in those studies. They have an explanation, so they are not
aversive.10 Second, in uncertainty effect studies, the focal item (e.g., the gift card
participants are purchasing) is uncertain, while in the risky promotion studies, the
10

A reviewer also suggested that the certain discount may be considered weird in these studies.
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“bonus” is uncertain. The focal transaction does not contain an unexplained feature, the
bonus does. Perhaps people tolerate (or even prefer) these features in such circumstances.
Another difference is that uncertainty effect studies typically use WTP as their
dependent variable, while the risky promotion studies use choice (Mazar et al., 2016) and
attractiveness ratings (Goldsmith & Amir, 2010). Perhaps the WTP question implicitly
forces a transaction on participants, enhancing the negative suspicions of buyers, but this
pressure dissipates in the other tasks. Moon and Nelson (2015) do not replicate the
uncertainty effect with a choice task, but Gneezy et al. (2006, p. 1292) do. The role of
elicitation mode on the effects of risk and of unexplained features remains an open
question, as there are too many differences in these respective designs to meaningfully
interpret the differences in results.

Potential transaction feature confounds in other literatures
Much of consumer research involves the comparison of valuations of the same
item across different transaction contexts. For example, the endowment effect compares
valuations of items being sold against those being purchased, and time preference studies
compare the valuations of delayed payments occurring at different points in time (e.g.,
payments happening today vs. payments happening in the future). Those contextual
differences may unintentionally have added unexplained features as well.
For example, it may be the case that giving participants an item and immediately
ask them to sell it is an atypical feature, relative to giving them money and offering the
opportunity to buy an item. This would depress WTP relative to WTA. Similarly,
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delaying a payment due today may be perceived as less justified than delaying a payment
occurring in the future. This potential confound would lead to more severe discounting of
immediate than future delays, typically interpreted as evidence of impatience. In many
cases, however, controlling for these differences may be difficult. In our case, for
example, we could not find a way to induce risk without adding transaction features, so
we added features to the riskless option, this may be the easiest path to control for the
weirdness confound in other paradigms as well.
This paper contains a supplement. Table 1 summarizes its contents.

Table 1. Index of supplementary materials (available from http://osf.io/fzjuw)
Section
Supplement 1. Complete age data for Studies 1-4
Supplement 2. Additional Analyses for Study 1
Supplement 3. Within-subject variation in valuation of gift cards in Studies 13
Supplement 4. Pairwise comparisons across all conditions in Study 4
Supplement 5. All means and pairwise comparisons for Studies 5A-B
Supplement 6. Study S1 – Isolating and mediating with weirdness
Supplement 7. Study S2 – Comparing ascending and descending price
sequences

Pages
2
3-4
5
6
7
8-10
11
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Appendix. Stimuli used in Studies 5A and 5B
Baseline (randomly selected from the following):
•
•
•

Imagine that you could buy a $50 gift certificate to Barnes and Noble as part of
this study. The gift certificate is good for use within the next two weeks.
Imagine that you could buy a $50 Target gift card as part of this study.
We are interested in how much you would pay for a $50 Barnes & Noble gift
certificate, which you could buy as part of this study.

Gneezy, List, and Wu (2006, p. 1301) Lottery
Imagine that we offer you a lottery ticket that gives you a 50 percent chance at a $50 gift
certificate for Barnes and Noble, and a 50 percent chance at a $100 gift certificate for
Barnes and Noble. Whichever gift certificate you win is good for use within the next two
weeks.
Yang, Vosgerau, and Loewenstein (2013, p. 737) Certain Coin
We are interested in how much you would be willing to pay for participating in a coin
flip. If heads comes up, you will get a $50 gift certificate for Barnes & Noble bookstore.
If tails comes up, you will get a $50 gift certificate for Barnes & Noble bookstore.
Yang, Vosgerau and Loewenstein (2013, p. 737) Uncertain Coin
We are interested in how much you would be willing to pay for participating in a coin
flip. If heads comes up, you will get a $50 gift certificate for Barnes & Noble bookstore.
If tails comes up, you will get a $100 gift certificate for Barnes & Noble bookstore.
Study 4 Certain Box
Imagine that you are standing in front of a table that has a locked box on it. The box has a
$50 Target gift card inside. You can pay to open the box and take the gift card, which
would be yours to keep.
Study 4 Risky Box
Imagine that you are standing in front of a table that has a locked box on it. The box has
two gift cards inside: a $50 Walmart and a $50 Target gift card.
You can pay to open the box and choose a gift card, which will be yours to keep. The gift
cards do not have the names of the stores printed on them, so you will not know which
gift card is which.
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CHAPTER 2.

CRITICAL CONDITION:
PEOPLE ONLY OBJECT TO CORPORATE EXPERIMENTS
IF THEY OBJECT TO A CONDITION

Robert Mislavsky
Berkeley Dietvorst
Uri Simonsohn

ABSTRACT
Why have companies faced a backlash for running experiments? Academics and pundits
have argued that it is because the public finds corporate experimentation objectionable. In
this paper we investigate “experiment aversion,” finding evidence that, if anything,
experiments are rated more highly than the least acceptable policies that they contain. In
five studies participants evaluated the acceptability of either corporate policy changes or
of experiments testing those policy changes. When all policy changes were deemed
acceptable, so was the experiment, even when it involved deception, unequal outcomes,
and lack of consent. When a policy change was unacceptable, the experiment that included
it was deemed less unacceptable. Experiments are not unpopular, unpopular policies are
unpopular.
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In June 2014, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Science (PNAS)
published an article describing the results of a field experiment where academic authors
(Kramer, Guillory, & Hancock, 2014) partnered with Facebook to manipulate content
users saw (i.e., “News Feeds”), showing either more positive or more negative emotional
content, to measure potential emotional contagion. A month later, the online dating site
OkCupid published a blog post titled “We Experiment on Human Beings,” which
described three experiments they had run on their users (Rudder, 2014). Reaction to the
revelation of these experiments was swift and highly negative.
The backlash the Facebook and OkCupid experiments received, described by a
Forbes contributor as “one epic freak out” (Muse, 2014), dominated several news cycles
despite competing for attention with the 2014 World Cup and major U.S. Supreme Court
rulings. Articles describing the negative reaction to the Facebook experiment reached the
front page of the Wall Street Journal and were the number one most popular/shared
articles on several news outlets, including The Atlantic, The Wall Street Journal, and The
BBC.11 Articles on CNN.com and in the New York Times proclaimed that Facebook
treated users like “lab rats” (Goel, 2014; Goldman, 2014). When the OkCupid experiment
was revealed, an article in FastCompany declared that the experiment was “way creepier”
than Facebook’s (Greenfield, 2014). Even legislators got involved, calling for
investigations into data collection practices (R. Meyer, 2014; Stampler, 2014). A few
months later, Facebook’s chief technology officer formally acknowledged that the
company was “unprepared” for the reaction elicited by the experiments and admitted that
11

Internet Archive screenshots from The Atlantic (June 29, 2014), Wall Street Journal (June 30, 2014), and
BBC (June 30, 2014) showing lists of most popular articles can be found at https://osf.io/z39aq.
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they “should have considered non-experimental ways” to conduct research on the topic
(Schroepfer, 2014).
In this paper, we present evidence suggesting that the backlash to these
experiments had nothing to do with the experimentation itself. Instead, the backlash was
likely driven by the specific policies that these experiments contained (i.e., the individual
treatment arms), and reactions would have been at least as negative if these were
implemented as standalone policy changes, outside of an experimental context. We
conclude that marketing researchers and organizational decision makers should not
hesitate to run field experiments using treatment arms that they would also be
comfortable implementing as individual policy changes, since experimentation does not
make policies more objectionable. Similarly, implementing objectionable policies outside
of an experiment will not make them more palatable to the public.

FIELD EXPERIMENTS AND MARKETING SCIENCE
Experimentation provides an unrivalled source of actionable intelligence for
businesses, governments, and non-profit organizations (Zoumpoulis, Simester, &
Evgeniou, 2015), allowing researchers to identify the causal effects that alternative
policies have on behavior.12 Field experiments overcome the lower external validity of
stylized lab experiments by taking place in the precise environment where specific policy
changes will occur (DellaVigna, 2009). In part because of these advantages, field
experimentation has become a popular tool for marketing scholars that is used to test and
12

We define an experiment as an instance where an organization implements different policies for
different groups with the intention of learning how they differently influence a specific outcome.
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complement existing theory, as well as develop new insights into buyer behavior on
wide-ranging topics. Within marketing, field experiments have been used to explore
charitable giving behavior (Sudhir, Roy, & Cherian, 2016), the effect of social influence
on the adoption of new technologies (Miller & Mobarak, 2015), strategies for inducing
multi-channel buying (Montaguti, Neslin, & Valentini, 2016), and consumer purchasing
habits after the end of a promotion (Yanwen Wang, Lewis, Cryder, & Sprigg, 2016).
Given the value of field experimentation, concerns about its acceptability must be
taken seriously. Many pundits and scholars have interpreted the backlash to well-known
field experiments as evidence that people have a broad and substantial aversion to
experimentation. Gino (2015), for instance, proposed that managers are hesitant to run
experiments within their own organizations, in part because they believe that customers
and employees do not want to be experimented on. Hill (2014) found that companies that
do run experiments often resort to using terms like “diagnostic test” or “A/B test” to
avoid presumed negative associations with experimentation (see also, Luca, 2014). M.
N. Meyer (2015) stated that people view field experiments as “more morally suspicious
than an immediate, universal implementation of an untested practice” (p. 278) and titled
this preference the “A/B illusion.”
If consumers are indeed averse to experimentation, it would constitute an
important barrier to evidence-based marketing and future collaborations between
academics and organizations. Organizational decision makers may hesitate to run or
publicize the results of experiments for fear of negative publicity, and customers may fear
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engaging with companies that they believe will experiment on them. In this article, we
investigate whether or not such an aversion to experimentation exists.

THREE FORMS OF “EXPERIMENT AVERSION”
We define three different forms that experiment aversion could take and preview
our ability to empirically distinguish among them in this article:
1. Absolute experiment aversion – All experiments are deemed unacceptable,
independent of the policies they include.
2. Relative experiment aversion – An experiment is less acceptable than the
policies it contains, either because experimentation is a negative attribute (i.e.,
a main effect), or because the underlying policies are deemed less acceptable
when they are part of an experiment (i.e., an interaction). This means
experiments with acceptable policies could still be considered acceptable in
absolute terms, but less acceptable than their underlying policies.
3. Critical condition – There is no experiment aversion. The acceptability of an
experiment is instead a weighted average of the acceptability of its policies.
Most importantly, this implies an experiment is no less acceptable than its least
acceptable policy. Thus, an experiment is only viewed negatively if one of its
conditions is viewed negatively.
In Studies 1 and 2, we test for absolute experiment aversion and find several
instances where experiments are, in fact, rated positively. Thus, we reject absolute
experiment aversion. In Studies 3 and 4 we directly pit the acceptability of experiments
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against the acceptability of their underlying policies, finding that experiments are rated as
no less acceptable than their least acceptable policies, consistent with the critical
condition account of experiment aversion. Experiments, however, were also rated as less
acceptable than the simple average acceptability of the underlying policies. This may
reflect either moderate relative experiment aversion or negativity bias, where people give
more weight to negative attributes than to positive ones (e.g., Folkes & Kamins, 1999;
Rozin & Royzman, 2001; Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). In Study 5, we tease these two
apart by asking participants to evaluate experiments with two positive policies that are
similarly acceptable (thus negativity bias should be absent), and find no evidence of even
modest experiment aversion. Therefore, our combined results support the “critical
condition” account of experiment evaluation.
TRANSPARENT REPORTING
In all 5 studies, participants read scenarios describing an action that a company
could take (either an experiment or a universal policy change) and indicated how
acceptable each action is. We ran all studies, except for Study 3b, on Amazon’s
Mechanical Turk (MTurk) using Qualtrics. Study 3b was a pen-and-paper survey of nonacademic university staff.
Study materials, data, analysis code, and supplements for all studies as well as
preregistrations for Studies 3b-5 are available at https://osf.io/z39aq. We report studies in
the order they were conducted (except for Study 3b, which was added at the request of
reviewers and conducted after Study 4) and discuss all additional studies conducted but
not reported in the paper in Supplements 5 and 6. For all studies, we determined sample
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size before beginning data collection.13 We report all data exclusions, all manipulations,
and all measures.
STUDY 1: PEOPLE DO FIND (SOME) EXPERIMENTS ACCEPTABLE
Our first study tests for absolute experiment aversion—people always object to
experiments, even if all conditions are unambiguously beneficial. We presented
participants with descriptions of corporate experiments that contained unambiguously
positive conditions (e.g., giving $5 to employees for visiting the gym) or unambiguously
negative conditions (e.g., taking $5 from employees for not visiting the gym). If absolute
experiment aversion exists, participants should find all experiments objectionable. If
experiments are instead evaluated based on their conditions, participants should only
object to experiments that contain unambiguously negative conditions. Throughout these
scenarios, we also added various aspects of experimentation that may contribute to
experiment aversion, such as deception and lack of consent. If these specific features
cause experiment aversion, participants should view these experiments negatively, even if
they have only unambiguously positive conditions.
Method
Sample. We recruited 577 participants on MTurk, of which 505 successfully
passed the attention check (37.5% female, Mage = 34.1 years). Participants were paid
$0.75 for completing the study.
13

In our online studies, we typically obtained sample sizes that slightly exceeded our goals because some
participants did not submit a completion code, allowing additional participants to take the survey.
Participants, identified by their MTurk ID number, were not able to participate in more than one study. We
included an attention check (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) in the first question, and only
those who answered correctly were able to participate in the studies. All participant responses are included
in analyses, regardless of whether or not they completed the entire survey.
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Design. Participants were assigned to one of ten experimental conditions. Fiftythree participants were assigned to the policy change condition. The remaining
participants (N = 452) were assigned to one of nine experiment conditions.
Participants in the policy change condition read descriptions of nine possible
policy changes. These involved bad, good or very good outcomes, in three different
contexts. See Table 2. Participants evaluated all nine policies in random order, answering
three questions about their acceptability. We average them (Cronbach’s α = .96) to
construct the “policy acceptability index.” These ratings served as a manipulation check
for our stimuli in the experiment conditions.
Participants in the nine experiment conditions read one scenario about a company
running an experiment that randomly assigned employees/customers to one of two policy
changes from one of the three contexts in Table 2. The condition pairs were bad/good,
control/good, or good/very good. For example, the shipping control/good scenario read:
“A shopping company runs an experiment on their shipping system where one
group of customers is randomly picked and the company starts upgrading all
‘Standard 5-day’ shipped packages to ‘Priority 3-day’ shipping (without changing
the cost to the customer). Another group of customers is randomly picked and
gets no change in their shipping. The company will then compare customer
satisfaction across the two groups.”

Participants then answered the same three questions from the policy change condition
(measures 1-3 in Table 2), but now focusing on the experiment as a whole rather than the
underlying policies. They also answered three additional questions designed to more
unambiguously evaluate the acceptability of the experiment (rather than willingness to
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Table 2. Stimuli and measures for Study 1

Context
1. Shipping
2. Company gym
3. Product
recommendations

Policy changes
Bad
Good
Slower
Faster delivery
delivery
$5 penalty
$5 bonus for
for not going going
Poorly rated Highly rated
products
products

Very good
Much faster
delivery
$10 bonus for
going
Highest rated
overall

Measures of Acceptability
Participants indicated agreement (1=Strongly Disagree; 7=Strongly Agree),
with these statements.
Acceptability of policy changes
1. It is okay for the company to do this.
2. If I were [an employee/a customer], I would object to this.
(reverse-coded)
3. If I were [an employee/a customer] and was asked, I would agree
to this.
Acceptability of experiment
4. It is immoral to run this experiment (reversecoded)
5. People in this experiment are being treated
like guinea pigs (reverse-coded)
6. The company should be not allowed to run
this experiment (reverse-coded)
Notes: Participants in the policy change condition rated all nine policy changes. Participants in the
experiment conditions rated one of nine experiments created by pairing two policy changes within a
context. The pairs consisted of bad/good, control/good or good/very good. Control consists of keeping the
status quo (e.g., shipping item as promised). The average of questions 1-3 is the policy acceptability index,
the average of questions 4-6 the experiment acceptability index.

participate in it). We average only these additional three questions (α = .86) to construct
the “experiment acceptability index.” 14
14

In hindsight we found questions 1-3 to be ambiguous for interpreting the evaluation of experiments.
Therefore, the experiment acceptability index in the main text is based only on questions 4-6. We report
results aggregating over all 6 questions in footnote 15.
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Participants also answered five comprehension checks to ensure they noticed
potentially controversial attributes of the experiments (e.g., “People will be included in
this study without agreeing to be included”). No other measures were collected in this
condition. Results for measures not reported below are reported in Supplement 1.
Results
Acceptability of policy changes. Validating our choice of stimuli, the overall
policy acceptability index for bad policy changes (M = 1.91) was below the midpoint (4)
and below both the good (M = 6.18) and very good policy changes (M = 6.11), which
were both above the midpoint. All t-tests vs. midpoint are ts > 20.9, ps < .001. The good
and very good policies were rated as similarly acceptable, t(312) =.48, p = .63, and were
close to the highest possible rating (medians of 6.7 and 7 respectively, on a 7-point scale).
Acceptability of experiments. Figure 3 shows the average experiment acceptability
index for the nine experiment conditions. The results are inconsistent with absolute
experiment aversion. In particular, when experiments did not include an objectionable
condition (control/good, M = 5.11; good/very good, M = 5.17), they were rated above the
midpoint and as more acceptable than when experiments did include an objectionable
condition (bad/good, M = 3.25). The experiments with objectionable conditions were in
turn rated below the midpoint. All t-tests vs. midpoint are ts > 5.9, ps < .001. People
found experiments to be acceptable when all conditions in the experiment were
acceptable and found experiments to be unacceptable when a condition in the experiment
was unacceptable.15
15

These results are based on questions 4-6 in Table 2 (see footnote 14). Including all six questions, the
results are very similar. Experiments with a bad condition (bad/good, M = 3.01) were rated below the
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Discussion
The results from Study 1 are inconsistent with absolute experiment aversion and
consistent with a critical condition account of experiment evaluation. Additionally,
participants found experiments with deception (e.g., one shipping speed was promised,
another was actually delivered), unequal outcomes (e.g., some participants get $5 for
attending the gym, others get $10), and lack of consent, to be acceptable, as long as all
conditions were themselves acceptable.

However, Study 1 has some important limitations. First, the experiments
evaluated as acceptable had unambiguously beneficial outcomes (e.g., free shipping
upgrade) and may not generalize to more routine corporate experiments where benefits to
participants, if any, are less obvious. Second, we measured agreement with statements
rather than absolute measures of acceptability, making it difficult to know whether the
experiments are sufficiently acceptable. For example, the good/very good experiments
were rated M = 5.17 on a 7-point scale where 7 implies strong agreement with the
experiment being acceptable. While this is significantly above the midpoint, is it high
enough to suggest people would not object to the experiment? Third, participants’ ratings
in the policy change and experiment conditions are not directly comparable because: (i)
the sets of dependent variables, and their interpretation, are different in the policy and
experiment conditions (see footnotes 14 and 15) and (ii) participants saw all nine policies
in the policy change condition and only two in the experiment conditions. Fourth,
midpoint and below experiments without a bad condition (control/good, M = 5.17; good/very good, M =
5.30), which were both above the midpoint. All t-tests vs. midpoint are ts > 8.4, ps < .001.
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participants in this experiment may have higher than average tolerance for experiments
because they routinely volunteer for experiments on Amazon Mechanical Turk.

Figure 3. Experiments without bad policies (gray and white circles) are rated positively
(Study 1)

Bad and Good

Policy changes in experiment
Control and Good
Good and Very Good

7 - Most acceptable

6
5.75

(mean of 3 measures)

5.56

5

4.98

4.92

4.79

4.69

4
3.75

3

3.05

2.90

2
Company Gym

Recommendations

Shipping

1 - Least acceptable

Notes: Each participant (N = 452) rated the acceptability of one experiment (out of 9 possible
experiments). Markers depict sample averages; error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

In Studies 2-5 we address all of these issues. We use a wider variety of stimuli
(Studies 3a and 3b) and have participants evaluate experiments similar to (controversial)
experiments that companies have actually run (Studies 2 and 4). We use questions with
less ambiguous endpoints (Studies 2-5) and with neutral and labeled midpoints (Studies
3-5). We have participants in the policy change condition rate only the two policy
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changes that are included in the corresponding experiment condition (Studies 3-5) and
use the same measures of acceptability across conditions (Studies 2-5). Finally, in Study
3b, we recruited participants who do not routinely volunteer for experiments.
STUDY 2: PREDICTING EXPERIMENT RATINGS FROM CONDITION RATINGS
Kramer et al. (2014) ran an experiment studying emotional contagion through
social networks. They manipulated mood by modifying the emotional content of
Facebook users’ status updates and measured its effect on users’ subsequent emotion
expression, which upset many users and spurred public outrage (Albergotti, 2014). If, as
we have conjectured, people objected to the study because of its polices and not just
because it was an experiment, then they should not object to a similar experiment with
only acceptable conditions. In Study 2a, we conduct an exploratory search for acceptable
and unacceptable mood inductions Facebook could have employed. In Study 2b, we test
if the acceptability of the experiment hinges on the acceptability of the mood inductions
used.
STUDY 2A: FINDING (UN)ACCEPTABLE MOOD INDUCTIONS
Method
Sample. We recruited 382 participants on MTurk, of which 303 passed the
attention check (40.7% female, Mage = 30.3 years). Participants were paid $0.30 for
completing the study.
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Table 3. Overview of study design and contributions

Study 1

•
•

Studies 2a & 2b

•
•
•

Study 3a

Study 3b
Study 4
Study 5

•
•
•
•
•

Test of absolute experiment aversion.
People find experiments with unambiguous benefits
acceptable.
Extends Study 1 with more realistic stimuli.
Acceptability of conditions predicts acceptability of
experiments.
Direct comparison of experiments with underlying
conditions.
Experiments rated at least as acceptable as worst condition is.
Results hold for variety of stimuli.
Replicates Study 3a results using a sample that does not
regularly volunteer for experiments
Best known example of experiment aversion is not an
instance of experiment aversion
Experiments with similar and positively-viewed policies are
rated identically to the average policy

Design. We generated six interventions, involving positive and negative versions
of three possible changes to the site—showing only sad ads, showing only happy ads,
showing sad status updates first, showing happy status updates first, showing the least
liked status updates first, and showing the most liked status updates first. Each participant
evaluated three alternative policies, one for each possible change to the site, randomizing
whether participants saw the positive or negative change. We counterbalanced the order
of the stimuli.
Measures. Participants answered two questions for each policy change: “Is it okay
for a company to do this?” and “Would you object to a company doing this?” These
questions were answered on 7-point scales, with endpoints labeled “1. It’s definitely not
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okay”/ “7. It’s definitely okay” and “1. I would definitely object”/ “7. I would definitely
not object,” respectively. We average the two items (r = 0.69; second question reversecoded) to construct the “policy acceptability index.”
Results
Participants found negative changes less acceptable than positive ones and
manipulating status updates less acceptable than manipulating ads. From most to least
acceptable, they ranked happy ads (M = 5.67), most liked status updates (M = 4.63),
happy status updates (M = 4.58), sad ads (M = 3.90), least liked status updates (M = 3.62)
and sad status updates (M = 3.08). For Study 2b, we used the highest rated (happy ads)
and lowest rated (sad status updates) changes to test our prediction that experiments are
only objectionable if they contain objectionable conditions.
STUDY 2B: EXPERIMENTS WITH (UN)ACCEPTABLE MOOD INDUCTIONS
Method
Sample. We recruited 255 participants on MTurk, of which 201 passed the
attention check (43.9% female, Mage = 34.2 years). Participants were paid $0.30 for
completing the study.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions in a
between-subjects design. In both conditions, participants read descriptions of a social
networking company that ran an experiment, assigning half of its customers to a control
condition and the other half to a treatment condition. The treatment condition in those
experiments was either the happy ads or sad status updates policy described in Study 2a.
Participants answered the same two acceptability questions from Study 2a.
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Results
The results were consistent with the critical condition account of experiment
evaluation and inconsistent with absolute experiment aversion; only the experiment with
an objectionable condition was considered objectionable. Participants rated the happy ads
experiment significantly above the midpoint (M = 4.72), t(98) = 3.47, p < .001, and the
sad status updates experiment below it (M = 2.59), t(99) = 9.30, p < .001.
Although Study 2 shows that experiments with acceptable conditions are
acceptable in an absolute sense, relative experiment aversion may still exist if
experiments are rated as being less acceptable than their underlying conditions. In Study
3 we examine this possibility by directly comparing ratings of individual policies to
experiments that use these policies as conditions.
STUDY 3A: TESTING FOR RELATIVE EXPERIMENT AVERSION
Method
Sample. We recruited 533 participants on MTurk, of which 423 passed the
attention check (43.5% female, Mage = 36.0 years). Participants were paid $0.50 for
completing the study.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions, in a 2
(action: policy change vs. experiment) x 3 (policy combination: negative/positive vs. no
change/positive vs. negative/no change) fully between-subjects design.
Participants in the policy change conditions were told that a company was
deciding between two policies. They were then told to imagine the company chose one of
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the policies and answered three questions about the acceptability of this action. They then
answered the same questions, but imagining that the other policy had been chosen.
Participants in the experiment conditions were told that a company was running
an experiment that randomly assigned customers to one of two policies (from the same
pool of policy pairs as the policy change conditions) and answered the same questions as
the policy change conditions.
Stimulus selection and sampling. To reduce the probability that the results would
be driven by idiosyncratic features of the selected stimuli (Wells & Windschitl, 1999), we
presented policy changes for seven different contexts (e.g., showing emotionally charged
ads, changing a product recommendation system, and changing frequency of issuing
coupons). See Supplement 2 for a full list of stimuli.
Measures. Participants in all conditions answered the following three questions
containing labeled neutral midpoints:
1. How okay is it for the company to do this?
(1 = It’s really bad; 4 = It’s okay; 7 = It’s really good)
2. If you were a customer of this company and learned about the company’s
plans, how would this influence your opinion of the company?
(1 = I would view the company much more negatively; 4 = […] not view
the company any differently; 7 = […] much more positively)
3. If you were a customer of this company and learned about the company’s
plans, how likely would you be to switch to a different company?
(1 = […] definitely not switch […]; 4 = […] not change how likely I am to
switch [...]; 7 = […] would definitely switch […]; reverse-coded)
Participants in the policy change condition answered these questions twice, once
for each policy (in counterbalanced order). Participants in the experiment condition
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answered these questions once, evaluating only the experiment. We average these items
(α = .86) to construct an “acceptability index.”
Results
Evaluating policy changes. Validating our choice of stimuli, the negative policies
were rated as the least acceptable (M = 2.65), followed by the no change (M = 4.61) and
positive (M = 5.46) policies. The negative policies were rated below the midpoint (4),
while the no change and positive policies were rated above the midpoint, all ts > 6.4, ps <
.001.
Evaluating experiments. Replicating the results from Studies 1 and 2, and again
inconsistent with absolute experiment aversion, experiments that only included
acceptable policy changes (no change/positive) were rated as acceptable (M = 4.38);
significantly above midpoint, t(79) = 3.54, p < .001. Conversely, experiments with an
unacceptable policy (negative/positive, M = 3.22; negative/no change, M = 3.31) were
rated below the midpoint, ts > 4.3, ps < .001. Because, in this study, we used a labeled
neutral midpoint (see ‘Measures’ above), evaluations above/below the midpoint are
unambiguously positive/negative.
Because participants may not all have the same opinion of which policy is
“worst,” we compare participants’ average ratings of each experiment in the experiment
conditions to the average rating of each participant’s less preferred policy in the
corresponding policy change conditions. When comparing average experiment ratings to
the average of the lowest rated corresponding policies, participants found experiments to
be significantly more acceptable in the no change/positive, t(139) = 2.53, p = .013, and
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negative/positive, t(139) = 4.23, p < .001, conditions, and marginally more acceptable in
the negative/no change conditions, t(137) = 1.77, p = .079. Collapsing across all policy
combinations, experiments were rated as significantly more acceptable than the policy
that represented their least acceptable condition, t(419)=5.16, p < .001.16 Most
importantly, experiments were not rated as less acceptable than their worst conditions
(see Figure 4). This suggests that participants rate experiments as some weighted average
of its policies.

STUDY 3B: REPLICATION WITH FIELD SURVEY
One concern about the generalizability of our findings may be that our results to
this point have relied on a sample (MTurkers) that regularly opts-in to taking experiments
and may therefore be less experiment averse than the general public. In this study,
following suggestions of the review team, we replicated our findings using a sample of
participants from outside an established participant pool.
Method
Sample. Three research assistants walked around a university campus, approached
non-academic staff members, and asked them if they were willing to take a short, onepage pen-and-paper survey. We specifically instructed the research assistants to approach
staff in and around non-academic buildings (e.g., the student union and library) to reduce
16

These results are consistent when comparing each experiment to the policy change with the lowest
average rating (as opposed to the average of each participant’s lowest rated policy). Experiments were rated
directionally more acceptable than their worst policies in all three cases (significantly so for the
negative/positive experiment; t(139) = 3.94, p < .001, negative/no change experiment, t(132) =2.06, p = .04
and when collapsing across all policy pairs, t(419) = 4.27, p < .001).
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the likelihood that our participants themselves would be involved in conducting research.
It is also important to note that our respondents did not initiate participation in the study
(reducing potential selection effects), nor were they compensated for completing the
survey (which may have caused them to view academic research and experimentation
more favorably). In total, we obtained 247 responses (68.4% female, Mage = 33.4 years).

Figure 4. Experiments (gray squares) are no less acceptable than their least acceptable
condition (white circles) (Study 3a)

Least Acceptable Policy

Experiment

Most Acceptable Policy

7 - Most acceptable
Policies:
Negative/Positive

Policies:
Negative/No Change

Policies:
No Change/Positive

6
(mean of 3 measures)

5.73
5.37
5.08

5

4.38

4 - Neutral

3.94

3.22

3

3.31
2.95

2.38

2

1 - Most unacceptable
Notes: Each participant (N=423) rated the acceptability of a company choosing one of two policies or
running an experiment using those two policies as conditions. The policies involved a negative change, a
positive change, or no-change. Circular markers depict means evaluation of each policy, squared markers
the evaluations of the experiment that combines them. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

Design. Participants were assigned to one of two conditions (policy change vs.
experiment) in a between-subjects design.
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The design of the study was nearly identical to that of Study 3a, with two
changes. First, participants only evaluated the negative/positive stimuli (i.e., the left-most
panel from Figure 4). Second, to make the survey fit on one page, we only included one
of the three dependent variables (“How okay is it for the company to do this?”) from
Study 3a.
Results
Replicating our results from Study 3a, participants rated the experiments (M =
3.54) more favorably than their worst conditions (M = 2.41), t(239) = 7.06, p < .001.17
These ratings are similar to MTurker ratings of identical stimuli in Study 3 (Experiments:
M = 3.35; Worst Conditions: M = 2.26).18
Discussion
The results from Studies 3a and 3b are inconsistent with absolute experiment
aversion, where people find all experimentation objectionable. Additionally, these results
are inconsistent with a version of relative experiment aversion that is large enough to
make an experiment less acceptable than its “worst” condition. In our next study, we
apply the paradigm from Study 3 to directly examine the potential role of experiment
aversion in the backlash to Kramer et al. (2014)’s Facebook experiment. Specifically, we
assess whether the backlash may actually be attributed to the policies people were
assigned to rather than experimentation per se.
17

This analysis was done using a regression with fixed effects for each stimulus. We preregistered that we
would also conduct a simple t-test collapsing across stimuli. The results are consistent, t(245) = 6.24, p <
.001.
18
These numbers are not the same as those in Study 3a (and in the left panel of Figure 4) because in Study
3a we used a composite of three measures. Here, we compare only results for the question (“Is it okay for
the company to do this?”) that we used in both studies.
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STUDY 4: WAS FACEBOOK BACKLASH REALLY EXPERIMENT AVERSION?
As in Study 2, we investigated perceptions of an experiment based on Kramer et
al. (2014). Unlike in Study 2, we used only stimuli that represented the specific
conditions used in that experiment, rather than modifying certain aspects to find an
“acceptable” version. We also used the same bipolar scales as Study 3, with labeled
neutral midpoints, to evaluate policy changes and experiments.
Method
Sample. We recruited 748 participants on MTurk, of which 608 passed the
attention check (41.3% female, Mage = 32.2 years). Participants were paid $0.30 for
completing the study.
Design. The overall design of Study 4 was nearly identical to that of Study 3, but
used different stimuli. Participants were randomly assigned to one of six conditions in a 2
(action: policy change vs. experiment) x 3 (policy combination: sad/happy vs. no
change/happy vs. sad/no change) fully between-subjects design.
Participants in the policy change condition read that Facebook was considering
making two policy changes (randomly selected from: sorting status updates to prioritize
happy ones, to prioritize sad ones, or making no change). They then read that Facebook
chose to implement one of the two policies. Participants in the experiment condition read
that Facebook was considering running an experiment where they would randomly assign
customers to two of the policy changes described above.
Measures. Participants answered the same acceptability questions from Study 3.
However, because Facebook does not have an obvious competitor, we did not ask if
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participants would switch to a different company.19 We average these two variables (r =
.80) to construct the “acceptability index.” Participants then indicated whether or not they
had previously heard of Facebook taking similar actions in the past. This was collected to
account for participants that may have been influenced by media coverage of the
Facebook study.20
Results
Figure 5 shows the main results from Study 4. All three experiments (grey
squares), even the experiment with ostensibly “good” conditions (i.e., happy/no change),
were rated significantly below the acceptability midpoint (ts > 4.8, ps < .001). At first
glance, this could be consistent with absolute or relative experiment aversion. However,
this conclusion is not supported once we take into account the fact that the underlying
policies are unacceptable even outside of an experimental context. The lowest rated
condition in each experiment was rated no higher than a 2.93 on a 7 point scale;
significantly below midpoint, ts > 9.4, ps < .001.21

19

We exploratorily asked if participants would be inclined to cancel their Facebook membership; see
preregistration file.
20
Most participants said that they had not heard of Facebook doing something similar (70.3% in the
experiment condition and 82.2% in the policy change condition). Those with prior knowledge in the
experiment condition rated Facebook’s actions slightly more negatively (M = 2.77) than those with no prior
knowledge (M = 3.06), t(301) = 1.75, p = .08. There was no difference between ratings in the policy change
condition (p = .81). Therefore, we report results from all participants in our analysis.
21
The only specific policy that was rated above the midpoint was making no change (M = 5.10). Both sad
status updates (M = 2.48), and happy status updates (M = 3.67) are viewed as unacceptable (all pairwise ts
> 8.0, all ts vs. midpoint > 3.0).
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Figure 5. Facebook experiments (gray squares) are no less acceptable than their least
acceptable condition (white circles) (Study 4)
Least Acceptable Policy

Experiment

Most Acceptable Policy

7 - Most acceptable
Policies:
Sad/Happy

Policies:
Sad/No Change

Policies:
Happy/No Change

(mean of 3 measures)

6
5.21

5.21

5
4.32

4 - Neutral
3.28

3

2.93

2.92
2.61

2.72
2.20

2

1 - Most unacceptable

Notes: Each participant (N = 601) rated the acceptability of Facebook changing how status updates are
sorted or of running an experiment randomly assigning users to one of those changes. Circular markers
depict mean evaluations of the least and most acceptable change in the pair, squared markers mean
evaluations of an experiment randomly assigning users to them. For example, the first panel shows that
people evaluating sorting status updates by sad/happy rated the worst of these with M=2.70, the highest
with M = 4.22, and an experiment with M = 2.92. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.

As was the case in Study 3, when we directly compare the acceptability of
experiments to the acceptability of their treatments’ in the corresponding policy change
conditions, we see that experimentation does not decrease the acceptability of the
company’s actions relative to some weighted average of its policy ratings. Indeed,
experiments were again rated as at least marginally more acceptable than their worst
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conditions when considering each experiment individually, ts > 1.88, ps < .061, and
significantly more acceptable when collapsing across all three experiments, t(599) = 3.94,
p < .001.22
Discussion
Again, if there is relative experiment aversion, it is not large enough to push the
experiment’s ratings below the ratings of its policies. Thus, it is probable that participants
were not reacting negatively to experimentation per se but to each experiment’s
underlying policies. Although the reaction to the Kramer et al. (2014) Facebook
experiment is held up as evidence of a public distaste for corporate experiments, in Study
4 we find that Facebook probably did not face backlash because they ran an experiment,
but because they implemented unacceptable policies. This suggests the public’s reaction
would have been even worse had Facebook modified how status updates are sorted for all
(rather than for a random subset) of its users.

STUDY 5: RELATIVE EXPERIMENT AVERSION VS. CRITICAL CONDITION
Studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that relative experiment aversion, if it exists, may not
be strong enough to drive ratings of an experiment below some weighted average of its
policies. However, we cannot conclusively reject the existence of some relative
experiment aversion. Even though the experiments were not rated worse than the least
preferred policy, they were still rated below the equally-weighted average of its policies.
22

As indicated in our pre-registration, we ran a regression estimating ratings using fixed effects for each
policy pair and an indicator for whether the participant rated a policy or an experiment. The coefficient for
experiments was positive (b = .39; p < .001), indicating that experiments were rated more highly than
policies when controlling for which policies participants saw.
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This could be consistent with the critical condition account of experiment aversion if
participants are taking a weighted average of their ratings of the two policies and giving
more weight to the worse rated policy, as they might if they exhibit negativity bias
(Skowronski & Carlston, 1989). However, this finding could also be consistent with the
existence of moderate relative experiment aversion. For example, participants may be
averaging their opinions of the policies and then applying some fixed “experiment
penalty.” Alternatively, participants’ ratings of policies could be lower when those
policies are part of an experiment. We ran Study 5 to more directly tease apart these two
explanations by creating an experiment where both policies would be deemed equally
acceptable. If there is relative experiment aversion, an experiment over both policies
would be rated as lower than either, which would not happen if people evaluate
experiments based on their critical conditions. We view this design as one which
maximizes the ability to detect relative experiment aversion.
Method
Sample. We recruited 502 participants on MTurk, of which 406 passed the
attention check (46.4% female, Mage = 35.0 years). Participants were paid $0.40 for
completing the study.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects
conditions (policy change vs. experiment). We pretested the acceptability of 30 policies
(see Supplement 4) and chose two that had nearly identical means (Ms = 5.54 and 5.59
out of 7) and distributions of responses (SDs = 1.40 and 1.32). The general design of
Study 5 was similar to that of Studies 3 and 4. Participants read that a ride-sharing
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company (e.g., Uber, Lyft) was considering implementing two discounts (either a flat
10% discount or a $1 credit for every $10 spent) and either chose one of the two (policy
change condition) or ran an experiment where they randomly assigned customers to
receive one of the two discounts (experiment condition).
In both conditions, participants answered the following question: “How okay is it
for the company to do this?” (1 = It’s really bad; 4 = It’s okay; 7 = It’s really good).

Results
Participants rated both discounts (10% discount: M = 5.84; $1 credit for every
$10 spent: M = 4.85) significantly above the midpoint, ts > 9.14, ps < .001, indicating
that they viewed both discounts positively.23 Participants rated the experiment that
assigned participants to one of two discounts (M = 5.32) nearly identically to the average
discount (M = 5.34), t(399) = .21, p = .83, and well above the least preferred discount (M
= 4.61), t(399) = 5.24, p < .001. Participants in this study do not show even small levels
of experiment aversion.24

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Taken together, the results of our studies are inconsistent with both absolute and
relative experiment aversion, while consistent with the critical condition account of
23

We should point out that the mean ratings of the individual discounts diverged more in Study 5 (Ms =
4.85 and 5.85) than they did in the pilot (Ms = 5.54 and 5.59). We believe that this is because evaluating
only two discounts (compared to 10 in the pilot), made those discounts seem less similar.
24
The 95% confidence interval for the difference between the acceptability of the experiment and the
average policy is (-.21, +.26), thus we reject experiment aversion that is larger than .26 on our 7 point scale.
With a pooled standard deviation of 1.19, we can reject experiment aversion having a Cohen’s d > .22.
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experiment evaluation. In particular, experiments that include only acceptable policies are
deemed acceptable, and whether they include acceptable or unacceptable policies,
experiments are deemed to be at least as acceptable as their least acceptable policy.
These results are good news for companies that want to learn from experiments.
Companies should not be more hesitant to run an experiment that includes a certain
policy than to implement that policy outright. A practical takeaway for organizations
interested in running experiments is to first determine if their planned policy changes are
objectionable (e.g., through a survey) and then run an experiment to determine which
acceptable policy best achieves their desired objective.
Limitations
We have identified two key limitations with our studies. The first limitation is that
our samples consist primarily of people who volunteered to complete our studies,
possibly excluding individuals who most strongly oppose evidence gathering in general
or experiments in particular. We are optimistic this is not a consequential limitation for
two main reasons. First, our respondents did negatively evaluate experiments that
included negative policies, indicating that they do not have universally positive opinions
of experiments, and that they do discriminate between acceptable and unacceptable
practices. Second, Study 3b surveyed a sample of non-academic university staff, who do
not regularly participate in experiments. Their responses were indistinguishable from
those of our online samples. It is nevertheless obviously impossible to obtain data on the
attitudes of people who are unwilling to participate in an experiment.
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The second limitation is that it is difficult to specify the threshold of acceptability
that an action must reach to prevent a backlash. For example, a small group of motivated
people (e.g., activists or media personalities) could be vocal enough to cause backlash
against an experiment that most people find acceptable. At the same time, this concern
applies to any action an organization can take and not solely experiments. Comparing the
most extreme ratings across policy and experiment evaluations in our studies suggests
experiments are not more polarizing than are policies. In Study 3a, for example, 12.5% of
participants gave the negative policy the lowest possible rating and 7.6% of participants
gave the experiment the lowest possible rating, a pattern that holds in all studies where
this comparison is possible.25
This also speaks to a larger issue of how different people may view different
policy changes—what some may consider fine, others may find completely unacceptable.
For this reason, we compared experiments to each participant’s least preferred policy,
rather than the average of each specific policy. Additionally, it is important to examine
distributions of responses (rather than means) to determine if a certain policy, although it
may have a high mean, may be especially divisive (i.e., having a high variance). We
encourage researchers and practitioners to pretest the acceptability of policies using
surveys and measures like those we used in Studies 3 through 5.

25

In Study 3b, 35.5% gave the lowest possible rating to the worst policy, compared to 9.8% for the
experiment. In Study 4, these values are 20.7% and 12.9%, respectively, and in Study 5, they are 2.5% and
1.0%, respectively.
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Experiment aversion is an interaction
Finally, there are many factors that could influence how acceptable experiments
are. For example, much research has examined how people view the ethics of corporate
practices that can be included in experiments, such collecting sensitive data (e.g., Awad
& Krishnan, 2006; Culnan & Armstrong, 1999; Miyazaki, 2008), changing pricing
practices (e.g., Bolton, Warlop, & Alba, 2003; Campbell, 1999; Haws & Bearden, 2006),
or introducing new marketing strategies (e.g., Smith & Cooper-Martin, 1997).
Using the more specific context of our motivating example, it may be that
Facebook’s experiment was more objectionable because it involved emotions (or
specifically negative emotions).26 Our review team, in particular, proposed that perhaps
people view experiments as less acceptable if they are in an experiment compared to if
they simply heard about it or that it is less acceptable to tell customers about experiments
after the fact than before they are run. We report two studies that test these two
hypotheses in the supplement (Studies S4 and S5). We find that people prefer to hear
about experiments before (rather than after) they are run, and that people rate
hypothetical experiments that they were in similarly to those they merely heard about.
However, asking “Do these factors impact the acceptability of experiments?” will
not teach us about experiment aversion, because these factors can be present in corporate
actions within and but also outside of an experiment. A company can take an action and
only later tell customers about it. A company can also take an action and some nonparticipating observer then evaluate it. The critical question for the purposes of this
26

See Supplements 5-6 for descriptions of studies that test these questions.
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paper, then, is “Do these factors impact the acceptability of experiments more than they
impact the acceptability of underlying policies?” That is, is there an interaction between
these factors and whether or not they are part of an experiment? In Studies S4 and S5, we
find none of these hypothesized interactions (Study S4: t(794)=.99, p=.32; Study S5:
t(793)=.56, p=.58). For example, in Study S4 we find that the negative effect of learning
about an experiment after it is conducted (versus before it is conducted) is not larger than
the negative effect of learning about a policy change after it is conducted (versus before it
is conducted). We would expect the same to be true for other potential factors that could
influence opinion of experiments and universal policy changes. Experiments are not
unpopular, unpopular policies are unpopular.
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CHAPTER 3.

60% + 60% = 60%, BUT LIKELY + LIKELY = VERY LIKELY

Robert Mislavsky
Celia Gaertig

ABSTRACT
How do we combine others’ probability forecasts? Prior research has shown that when
advisors provide numeric forecasts, people typically average them together. If two
advisors think an event has a 60% chance of occurring, we will also believe it has a 60%
chance (more or less). However, what happens if two advisors say that an event is
“likely” or “probable”? In four studies, we find that people combine verbal forecasts
additively, making their forecasts more extreme than each advisor individually. If two
advisors say something is “likely,” people then believe that it is “very likely.”
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Imagine that you are heading out the door and wondering if you should bring an
umbrella. You check a weather app, which says there is a 30% chance of rain, and just to
be sure, you turn on the TV where the weatherperson says that there is a 50% chance of
rain. Given these two forecasts, do you bring an umbrella? Situations like these are
common in daily life, from the mundane, such as bringing an umbrella, to the serious,
such as getting a second opinion about a medical diagnosis. So how do we combine these
forecasts to make our own judgments? Well, it depends.
In the above example, the forecasts were numeric. We know from prior research
that we generally combine numeric probability forecasts by averaging them (Biswas,
Zhao, & Lehmann, 2011; Budescu & Yu, 2006, 2007; Wallsten, Budescu, & Tsao, 1997).
If one advisor says there is a “30% chance” and another says there is a “50% chance,” our
own forecasts will typically be somewhere between 30% and 50%. However, we
generally don’t use numeric probabilities in daily speech. Instead of saying there is a
“60% chance,” we use verbal probabilities, saying that an event will “probably” happen,
or that it is “likely” (Erev & Cohen, 1990; Zimmer, 1983). Despite this, there has been no
study of how we combine verbal probability forecasts, for example, how our own beliefs
update when two people tell us that something is “likely.” In the four studies that follow,
we find that people tend to combine verbal probability forecasts additively. Beliefs about
an event’s likelihood move closer to certainty when another person says an event is likely
and closer to impossibility when another says an event is unlikely, regardless of prior
beliefs.
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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN NUMERIC AND VERBAL FORECASTS
The differences between how we combine verbal versus numeric forecasts may be
traced to several documented differences between how numeric and verbal probabilities
are interpreted more generally. First, numeric probabilities are precise, while verbal
probabilities are vague (Beyth‐Marom, 1982; Lichtenstein & Newman, 1967; Zimmer,
1983). While a “60% chance” has a precise mathematical meaning, in a seminal study,
Lichtenstein and Newman (1967) found that “likely” was interpreted to mean anything
from 25% to 99%. Second, the subjective interpretations of numeric probabilities are
more context-dependent than verbal probabilities, which are processed more intuitively
(Bilgin & Brenner, 2013; Teigen, 2001; Teigen & Brun, 1995, 1999, 2000; Windschitl &
Weber, 1999; Windschitl & Wells, 1996). It is easier to evaluate verbal probabilities as a
positive or negative sign than it is for numeric probabilities. For example, a candidate that
is “likely” to win an election should feel confident, but a candidate with a “30% chance”
might feel confident if there are 10 other candidates, but not if there are two.
Recognizing these differences, organizations that provide subjective probability
forecasts have tried to standardize the interpretation of verbal probabilities in their
reports. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)27 defines “likely” as
“greater than 66%,” and the United States Director of National Intelligence (DNI)28
defines it as “between 55% and 80%,” although research suggests that these guidelines
27
28

https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/supporting-material/uncertainty-guidance-note.pdf
https://fas.org/irp/dni/icd/icd-203.pdf
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are mostly ineffective (Budescu, Broomell, & Por, 2009; Budescu, Por, & Broomell,
2012; Budescu, Por, Broomell, & Smithson, 2014).
However, even if these guidelines worked perfectly, they assume that verbal and
numeric probabilities differ only in how they are initially interpreted. We show that this
is not the case. They also differ in how they are aggregated, which can lead to drastically
different judgments from relatively similar inputs. For example, imagine a group of
military officials deciding to launch a risky operation. If the collected experts all agree
that the operation has a 60% chance of success, the ultimate decision-maker should also
think that the operation has a 60% chance of success. However, if the experts all agree
that success is “somewhat likely,” we show that the decision-maker might think that
success is nearly certain.
TRANSPARENT REPORTING
We report four studies in this manuscript and include six more in the supplement.
All studies were run on Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (MTurk) and were administered
through Qualtrics. Studies 2-4 were preregistered. For all studies we report all data
exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures. Preregistered exploratory measures are
mentioned in footnotes and discussed Supplement 1, along with preregistered secondary
analyses (e.g., robustness checks). Sample size for each study was determined before data
collection, and participants in all studies were excluded from participating in any related
studies run within one month. We analyze all answers participants provided, regardless of
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whether they completed the survey. Supplementary materials, including data, analysis
code, preregistrations, and survey materials, are available at http://osf.io/atruq.
STUDIES 1-3: PREDICTING FUTURE EVENTS
Our first three studies have a relatively common design. Participants are asked to
predict the likelihood of an event. To help make their forecasts, they are shown forecasts
from one or two advisors. Forecasts are given either verbally (e.g., “Rather Likely”) or
numerically (e.g., “60%”), which we refer to as forecast formats. Participants then make
their own forecasts on scales using the same format that the advisors used.
Analyses
To test the combination strategies that participants use, we look exclusively at the
proportion of participants that make extreme forecasts (i.e., forecasts that are closer to
impossibility or certainty than any individual advisor). For example, if the two advisors
in the study say that an event has a 60% and 65% chance of occurring, an extreme
forecast is anything that is 66% or higher. We predict that as the number of advisors
increases, more participants will make extreme forecasts when using verbal probabilities
than when using numeric probabilities. That is, we predict a positive interaction between
format and the number of advisors on the likelihood of making an extreme forecast.
We use this strategy because it is the most diagnostic test of whether participants use
an additive strategy, compared to, say, testing for mean differences. For example, means
can increase if participants move from far below the advisors’ average to slightly below
the advisors’ average. This could be consistent with both an averaging or additive
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combination strategy. On the other hand, a participant who moves from a non-extreme
forecast to an extreme forecast could not possibly be using an averaging strategy.
Finally, unless specified otherwise, analyses for Studies 1-3 are conducted using
probit regressions, including indicator variables for condition (and their interactions
where appropriate), fixed effects for each stimulus (e.g., stock), and clustering standard
errors by participant. Full regression tables can be found in Supplement 2.
STUDY 1: LIKELY + LIKELY = VERY LIKELY
Method
Sample. We recruited 205 participants (35.0% female, Mage = 33.7 years), each
paid $0.30.
Design. Participants were randomly assigned to one of two between-subjects
conditions. All participants saw information about a stock29 (ticker symbol, company
name, and most recent closing price) and predicted how likely it was that the stock’s
price would be higher in one year. Before making their own forecasts, participants also
saw forecasts from two (fictional) advisors.
In the numeric condition, the advisors’ forecasts were “60-69%,” and participants
made their forecasts on a 10-point numeric probability scale (1 = “0-9%”; 10 = “90100%”). In the verbal condition, the two advisors’ forecasts were “7 – Rather Likely,”
29

For Studies 1 and 2, stocks were randomly selected from a list of 10. Our analyses in both studies include
fixed effects for each stock. See Supplement 3 for full list of stimuli used.
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and participants made their forecasts on a 10-point verbal probability scale (1 = “1 –
Nearly Impossible”; 10 = “10 – Nearly Certain”; adapted from Windschitl & Weber,
1999). In both conditions, the advisors’ advice corresponded to the 7th point on their
respective scales, keeping the extremity of advisor forecasts constant across condition.
See Figure 6 for example stimuli and response scales.
Figure 6. Sample Study 1 stimuli and response scale
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Results
We classify participant forecasts as “extreme” if they are closer to certainty than
both advisors’ forecasts (i.e., answers from 8 to 10 on the response scale). More
participants in the verbal condition made extreme forecasts (29.4%) than in the numeric
condition (10.9%), Z = 3.29, p = .001.
This result suggests that participants are more likely to use an additive strategy
when combining verbal forecasts than they are when combining numeric forecasts.
However, this study has a key limitation: we do not know what participants’ forecasts
would have been if they had only seen one advisor forecasts. It may be that participants
always make more extreme forecasts when using verbal probabilities. Therefore, we need
to compare the amount of extreme forecasts participants make when only seeing one
advisor forecast and see how that proportion changes as they see additional advisor
forecasts. We do this in Study 2.
STUDY 2: SEQUENTIAL EVALUATION (AND UNLIKELY + UNLIKELY = VERY
UNLIKELY)
Method
Sample. We recruited 854 participants, of which 806 passed an attention check
(39.0% female, Mage = 33.4 years). Participants who completed the survey were paid
$0.35.
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Design. The general design of Study 2 was extremely similar to that of Study 1,
with two changes. As in Study 1, all participants saw information about a stock and
estimated how likely it was that the stock’s price would be higher in one year on either a
verbal or numeric scale. Participants again saw forecasts from two fictional advisors,
given either numerically or verbally.
Unlike in Study 1, advisor forecasts were shown one at a time (i.e., manipulated
within-subjects). Participants saw a forecasts from the first advisor, made their own
forecast, saw a forecast from a second advisor, and could revise their first forecast.
Further, we tested if our results held for forecasts below even chance by randomizing
advisors’ forecasts to be the 7th point on the response scale (i.e., “60-69%” or “Rather
Likely”) or the 4th point on the scale (i.e., “30-39%” or “Rather Unlikely”).
In summary, participants were assigned to one of four between-subjects
conditions in a 2 (format: numeric vs. verbal) x 2 (direction: above vs. below midpoint).
Number of advisors was manipulated within subjects for all participants.30
Results
Again, we classify participant forecasts as “extreme” if they are closer to certainty
than each advisor’s forecast (8 to 10 in the above midpoint conditions; 1 to 3 in the below
midpoint conditions). We preregistered that we would analyze the above and below
30

We also asked participants two exploratory questions about their perceptions of advisor consensus.
Participants perceived more consensus in the verbal condition (ps < .003), but this did not mediate our
effect. See Supplement 1.
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midpoint conditions together, but for ease of interpretation, we discuss them separately
here and include results from the combined analyses in footnote 31.
In the above midpoint condition, participants’ forecasts became more extreme
when they saw a second advisor. Specifically, 18.3% of participants made an extreme
forecast after seeing the first advisor in the verbal condition, which increased to 29.7%
after seeing the second advisor, Z = 4.13, p < .001. In contrast, the proportion of extreme
forecasts in the numeric condition directionally decreased as participants saw more
advisors (11.4% to 9.0%), Z = 1.24, p = .21. The interaction between format and number
of advisors is significant, Z = 3.62, p < .001.
This pattern also held in the below midpoint condition. As they saw the second
advisor’s forecast, the number of participants making extreme forecasts increased in the
verbal condition (13.1% to 23.1%, Z = 3.28, p = .001) but decreased in the numeric
condition (18.3% to 13.4%, Z = 2.46, p = .014). The interaction between format and
number of advisors is significant, Z = 4.14, p < .001.31 See Figure 7.
STUDY 3: REAL EVENTS AND ADVICE
In Studies 1 and 2, we tested how participants used forecasts from two fictional
advisors that gave identical forecasts. In Study 3, participants make forecasts for real
events using real advice (and as a result, had natural variation between advisors).

31

Combining the above and below midpoint conditions into one regression, the interaction between format
and number of advisors is significant, Z = 3.99, p < .001. There is no significant 3-way interaction between
format, number of advisors, and above/below midpoint, Z = -.41, p = .68, indicating that the effect is
approximately the same size for forecasts better or worse than even chance.
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Method
Sample. We recruited 626 participants (42.7% female, Mage = 35.6 years), each
paid $0.50.
Design. Participants were assigned to one of four between-subjects
conditions in a 2 (format: numeric vs. verbal) x 2 (number of advisors: 1 vs. 2) design.
All participants were shown information about ten Major League Baseball games
(randomly selected from the 15 games played that day) and asked to predict how likely it
was that the favorite would win each game. For each game, participants either saw one or
two forecasts, randomly selected from Fivethirtyeight.com, Fangraphs.com, or
VegasInsider.com.32
In the numeric condition, advisor forecasts were given as percentages (e.g.,
“55%”), and in the verbal condition, they were given as a number with a verbal label
(e.g., “55 – Somewhat Likely”). The number was added to the verbal condition to keep
the extremity of the advice consistent across conditions. Because advisor forecasts could
take any value between 0 and 100, participants answered on a 0 to 100 slider scale with
numeric or verbal labels depending on condition.

We also collected measures of participants’ baseball knowledge, favorite team, motivation, and trust in
the advisor websites. See Supplement 1.
32
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Figure 7. Participants’ forecasts become more extreme when they see additional verbal
forecasts, but not when they see equivalent numeric forecasts
Above Midpoint Condition

Below Midpoint Condition

Notes: Advisor forecasts in the above midpoint condition correspond to the seventh point (out of 10) on the
response scale (“60-69%” in the numeric condition and “Rather Likely” in the verbal condition). Advisor
forecasts in the below midpoint condition correspond to the fourth point on the response scale (“30-39%” in
the numeric condition and “Rather Unlikely” in the verbal condition. Extreme forecasts are those that are
above the seventh point in the above midpoint condition and below the fourth point in the below midpoint
condition. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.
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Results
Although participants made forecasts for all games played that day, we
preregistered that we would only analyze forecasts for games where both advisors agreed
on a winner, since those are the only games where we can meaningfully distinguish
extreme forecasts from average ones.
Again, we classify participant forecasts as “extreme” if they are closer to certainty
than each advisor forecast for each game.33 When participants saw only one advisor
forecasts, there were no differences between the proportion of extreme forecasts in the
numeric (50.0%) and verbal (55.5%) conditions, Z = 1.39, p = .17. However, participants
that saw two advisor forecasts made many more extreme forecasts in the verbal condition
(46.6%) than in the numeric condition (29.8%), Z = 5.11¸ p < .001.34 The interaction
between format and number of advisors is significant, Z = 2.93, p = .003.35
STUDY 4: DECISIONS BASED ON FORECASTS
In Studies 1 to 3, we find a common pattern. When participants see multiple
verbal probability forecasts from advisors, they are much more likely to combine them
We preregistered that we would classify “extreme” as above the average advisor’s forecast and that the
classification in the main text would be a secondary analysis. However, the analysis reported here is a more
conservative test and consistent with our definitions from Studies 1 and 2. The results using the original
definition are nearly identical, and we report them in Supplement 1.
34
We should note that, unlike in Study 2, the number of extreme forecasts decreased in both conditions
when participants saw two advisor forecasts. We believe that this is due to the granularity of the scale in
this study. That is, it is more difficult to give an exactly average forecast in this study (when it is 1 out of
101 points) than in Study 2 (when it is 1 out of 10 points). Indeed, in this study, only 13.0% of forecasts
were exactly “average” when participants only saw one advisor forecast, compared to 44.2% in Study 2.
35
We preregistered that we would include participant motivation, baseball knowledge, and average advisor
forecast as control variables. Without these controls, the interaction is significant, Z = 2.56, p = .01.
33
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additively than they are when they see multiple numeric probability forecasts. However,
it may be that this is caused by differences in how participants use the respective
response scales rather than, as we hypothesize, becoming more certain of an event’s
outcome. We test this in Study 4, where participants make a decision that should be
informed by their beliefs about the event’s likelihood.
Method
Sample. We recruited 809 participants (44.8% female, Mage = 35.3 years), each
paid $0.40.
Design. All participants were randomly assigned to read one of two scenarios
about making a purchase that involved uncertainty. In one scenario, participants read that
they were buying a plane ticket, where the price could change in the future. In the other
scenario, participants read that they were buying a cell phone, and a new model could be
released shortly. See Supplement 4 for full stimuli.
In both scenarios, participants were told that they checked a forecasting website
(e.g., Kayak.com in the plane ticket scenario). The website recommended waiting to
make the purchase, giving either a verbal or numeric forecast that the price of the plane
ticket would drop or that a new model would be released. Participants then indicated
whether they would make the purchase on a 7-point scale (1 = Definitely buy; 7 =
Definitely wait).
After indicating their purchase intent, participants were told that they checked a
second website, which gave the same forecast as the first. Finally, participants again
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indicated whether they would make the purchase on the same 7-point scale.36 For
example, participants in the plane ticket condition saw the following:
You want to buy a plane ticket for a vacation you are taking. You
found a ticket that fits your budget, but know prices can drop if
you wait (although they can also go up or the flight could sell
out). You’re willing to wait up to two weeks. You check a price
prediction website, which says the following:
"It is [somewhat/rather/55%/65%]37 likely that prices will drop in
the next two weeks."
Would you buy the ticket or wait to see if the price goes down?
[page break]
You decide to get a second opinion and check a different site
that also makes price predictions. The second site says:
"We think that it is [somewhat/rather/55%/65%] likely that prices
will decrease within the next two weeks."
Would you buy the ticket or wait to see if the price goes down?

Results
We preregistered that we would analyze the data collapsed across both scenarios,
comparing the proportion of participants who became more likely to wait (i.e., more
strongly agreed with the advice) when they saw the second website’s forecast. Over a
third of participants (33.8%) in the verbal condition became more likely to wait,
36

We also asked participants four exploratory questions measuring the extent to which the two sites used
different information, the extent to which the second site provided new information, the usefulness of the
second site, and which forecast the participant weighed more when making their decision. See Supplement
1 and General Discussion.
37
We included multiple probability levels for the sake of stimulus sampling, but the second website always
made the same forecast as the first site. We also counterbalanced the order of the precise wording of the
advice. We preregistered that we would collapse results across probability levels.
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compared to 20.5% in the numeric condition (20.5%), Z = 4.23, p < .001, indicating that
participants updated their beliefs more when seeing an additional verbal forecasts.
Considering participants’ untransformed responses, we find that although they were more
willing to follow the websites’ verbal advice overall (5.32 vs. 4.92), t(806) = 2.98, p =
.003, they increased their answers more after getting a second opinion in the verbal
condition than in they did after getting a second opinion in the numeric condition (i.e.,
there is a positive interaction between format and number of websites), t(806) = 2.28, p =
.02.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In four studies we find that people use different strategies to combine verbal
compared to numeric probability forecasts. Specifically, when combining verbal
forecasts, participants use an additive strategy, where their own forecasts move closer to
certainty or impossibility as they see new advisor forecasts. Conversely, when combining
numeric forecasts, participants’ forecasts move closer to advisor’s average forecast.
These differences, if unaccounted for, could have substantial effects on how we
understand judgments made from aggregating others’ forecasts and how we should
present multiple forecasts to others.
Our research raises two primary questions. First, are people acting more optimally
or less optimally when they use an additive strategy, compared to an averaging strategy?
Second, why are participants using an additive strategy to combine verbal forecasts? We
discuss these below.
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Is this optimal?
If given two verbal probability forecasts or two numeric probability forecasts,
how should we combine them? The unsatisfying answer is that it depends. When there
are few advisors using similar information to make their decision, averaging forecasts is
typically most effective, since reduces the impact of each advisor’s idiosyncratic error
(Ashton & Ashton, 1985; Wallsten, Budescu, Erev, & Diederich, 1997; Wallsten &
Diederich, 2001). However, when the number of advisors is sufficiently large, it is often
best to use a more additive approach, since individual forecasts are often too
conservative, particularly for hard to predict events (Ariely et al., 2000; Baron, Mellers,
Tetlock, Stone, & Ungar, 2014; Wallsten, Budescu, Erev, et al., 1997). Additionally, if
the advisors are using different information, then it may be optimal to use an additive
strategy regardless of the number of advisors (Baron et al., 2014; Wallsten & Diederich,
2001). In these cases, the decision-maker has more information than any individual
advisor and therefore has “a right to much higher confidence” (Baron et al., 2014, p.
134).38
Why does this happen?
In the studies presented in this paper and several studies reported in the
supplement, we tested several potential mechanisms that may be causing the effect.
Although we do not find strong evidence for any of these mechanisms in our studies, they
38

In Study 3, we found that participants in the verbal, 2 advisor condition were more accurate than those in
the numeric, 2 advisor condition (measured by their average Brier score), but this difference was small and
we hesitate to generalize it to other contexts. See Supplement 1.

80
are worth discussing, and our results do not necessarily mean that they are not present.
They may simply be difficult to capture using self-report measures or that they may all
contribute a small amount to the strategies that people use to combine forecasts.
Given the discussion in the previous section, participants could just be doing what
they believe is optimal. Because numeric probabilities are more precise (Beyth‐Marom,
1982; Lichtenstein & Newman, 1967; Zimmer, 1983), if two advisors give identical (or
nearly identical) forecasts, it may imply that the advisors used the same information to
make their forecasts. On the other hand, if two advisors give identical verbal forecasts,
there may be a greater chance that they used different information. Therefore, an additive
strategy would more optimal when combining verbal forecasts than when combining
numeric forecasts. Because verbal probabilities are considered more intuitive (Windschitl
& Wells, 1996), this would be consistent with the idea that people make less accurate
judgments when working with percentages but are better at working with more intuitive
probability formats, such as frequencies (Gigerenzer & Hoffrage, 1995; Hoffrage,
Lindsey, Hertwig, & Gigerenzer, 2000). Indeed Biswas et al. (2011) find that participants
use a more additive strategy to combine frequencies, although they suggest that this
occurs when frequencies are more difficult to combine.
If this is the case, we do not find evidence that this is a major contributor to our
effect. In Study 4, we asked participants if the websites used the same or different
information to make their decisions and to what extent the second website provided new
information. Participants thought that the second site used more different information and
provided more new information in the verbal condition (ps < .001). However, these
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measures mediated approximately 10% of the effect individually and 14% of the effect
together. In three additional studies reported in Supplement 5, which all used a similar
design to Study 2, we also asked participants if the second advisor had information that
the first advisor did not, how much information the second advisor is providing to the
participant, whether the advisors are using the same or different information to make their
decisions, and how much intuition (vs. deliberation) participants used. There were no
differences in participant responses between the numeric and verbal conditions (all ps >
.09).
The second major candidate mechanism we considered is that because verbal
probabilities have an inherent “direction,” they are intuitively converted to positive or
negative signals and added together.39 In Supplement 6, we report four studies with the
same general design as Study 2. Unlike in Study 2, however, we include an additional
numeric condition, where we explicitly tell participants to interpret any advisor forecast
above 50% as a positive sign. In three of the four studies, we find that participants are
directionally more likely to use an additive strategy in this condition compared to the
regular numeric condition, but none of these effects reach significance and are practically
zero in the two most highly powered replications (with sample sizes of 400 and 800 per
condition, respectively).
Finally, in several studies, we included questions on participant confidence,
advisor consensus, advisor thoughtfulness, the strength of the advisors’ opinions, whether
39

Yates and Carlson (1986) refer to this as “signed summation.”
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forecast accuracy relied more on luck or knowledge (i.e., is the uncertainty aleatory or
epistemic?), whether the advisor was making a subjective or objective judgment, and
participants’ trust in the advisors. For most of these questions, there were no differences
between responses in the verbal and numeric conditions, and where they did, none of
those differences mediated a meaningful proportion of our effect. See Supplement 8.
In summary, we find that individuals use distinct strategies to combine probability
forecasts from different sources, where their judgments become more confident as they
see more verbal forecasts and converge to the average as they see more numeric
forecasts. We also tentatively rule out some potential mechanisms. Future research
should delve deeper into possible causes of these differences and test how these strategies
might affect decision on a larger scale. Individuals, and particularly organizational
decision-makers, should take note of these results and consider their consequences when
receiving and presenting probability forecasts from multiple sources.
This paper contains a supplement. Table 5 summarizes its contents.
Table 5. Index of supplementary materials (available from http://osf.io/atruq)

Section
Supplement 1. Additional preregistered measures and analyses
Supplement 2. Full regression tables for Studies 1-4
Supplement 3. List of stimuli used for Studies 1-3
Supplement 4. Full scenario text for Study 4
Supplement 5. Studies testing whether advisors use same vs. different
information
Supplement 6. Studies testing effect of adding direction to numeric forecasts
Supplement 7. Studies testing use of intuition vs. deliberation
Supplement 8. Studies testing additional mechanisms
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